



















SO: Dr Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
GH:  Mr Gerald Hensley (Respondent) 
 
 
SO: Dr Sue Onslow talking to Mr Gerald Hensley in Martinborough, New 
Zealand, on Wednesday 2nd April 2014. Mr Hensley, thank you very 
much indeed for inviting me to this beautiful spot. I wonder, Sir, if you 
could please begin by talking about how you came to be recruited to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat from the New Zealand Diplomatic Service? 
 
GH: Well, like a lot of these things, it was purely accidental. I was Head of the 
Pacific and Antarctic Division in the New Zealand Foreign Ministry, but Alister 
McIntosh, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was a leading candidate for the 
position of Secretary General in 1965. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
had agreed to set up the Commonwealth Secretariat and in ’65 they had 
worked out details of how the Secretariat would operate. The next step was of 
course to recruit the Secretary General. It wasn’t done by any open election; it 
was done in a very Commonwealth way, by consultation among people 
around the world and McIntosh from New Zealand appeared to be the leading 
candidate. Then, rather surprisingly, Britain put forward a rather obscure man 
- the Governor of Honduras, I think from memory, as their candidate. And it 
was pretty obvious then that the aim was to spoil McIntosh’s chances. It was 
a mystery for years; Arnold Smith and I used to speculate why they would 
have done it and subsequently I suppose the most plausible explanation is 
that McIntosh was, although not known to us at the time, a homosexual, and it 
may have been they felt he was a security risk. At any rate, in London 
McIntosh decided that he would not press on with his candidacy and he went 
to the hotel where Arnold Smith, the Canadian diplomat was staying, who was 
in second place as the race was running at that stage, and said to Arnold that 
he was withdrawing because of his deafness - he was a little bit deaf - and 
that he would ask his support to favour Arnold instead. This put Arnold over 
the top as the preferred candidate. In return Arnold said to McIntosh, ‘I would 
like a young New Zealand Foreign Service Officer to be my special assistant’, 
and so when Mac came back he asked me if I would like to go. Well, I was so 
excited that I dropped even my house renovations and left them exactly… 
 
SO: You say in your memoirs about dropping your brush! 
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GH: Well, I was cleaning bricks over the fireplace, and years later I happened to 
come back into the house; and they were still half cleaned because they had 
been cleaned on that afternoon when I stopped, as it turned out, forever. So 
my wife and I, with a newly born child, went to London in September 1965. I 
was, I think, the first diplomatic officer to join the absolutely brand new 
Secretariat which then really consisted of Arnold as Secretary General and 
his PA, Joy Tilsley. We didn’t have either of the two deputies at that stage. 
But Arnold had a couple of Canadian diplomats helping him and a very nice, 
slightly eccentric, Bill (William) Cranston, from the British Foreign Office as an 
immediate assistance, and a very able administrative officer, Don Abbey, 
from, I think, the Commonwealth office; he certainly was from the British Civil 
Service. And those first weeks that was about it. 
 
SO: So when did Michael Wilson, the Australian, join?  
 
GH: Michael came a little bit later and that was an embarrassment to Arnold. 
Having recruited me, that was that as far as special assistants were 
concerned. Sir Robert Menzies was deeply suspicious of the Secretariat. He 
was opposed to the whole idea, disliked it and he was a bit inclined to be 
obstructive. However, since it was clearly going ahead, he then switched and 
insisted that an Australian be appointed to Arnold Smith’s private office. So 
we did all that could be done; that is, we split the Special Assistant’s job in 
two instead of one. It worked very well because Michael and I, an Australian 
and New Zealander, got on extremely well and the system worked a lot better 
than you might have thought from the outset. Whether Michael Wilson did 
exactly what Sir Robert Menzies had in mind, I think was probably very 
debateable. Michael was sceptical, very clear-sighted and not at all I think 
likely to have shared Sir Robert’s views.  
 
SO: So there were two Special Assistants in the Secretariat. You were based 
in Marlborough House at this time? 
 
GH: Yes. Michel and I occupied what had been the royal nursery when George V 
was a baby - there were still little bars across the lower part of the windows. 
 
SO: At this point then - with assistance from the British Civil Service, as you 
pointed to William Cranston and Don Abbey - how did Arnold Smith go 
about expanding the diplomatic representation within the Secretariat? 
 
GH: Yes, that was obviously a fairly urgent early job. To some extent it was 
interrupted by the crisis over Rhodesia, but we’ll come to that later on, no 
doubt. I can remember Arnold early on saying to me when we were first 
discussing recruiting that he would not ask Governments to nominate, he 
would seek out and ask for the people he wanted. He quite rightly realised, 
and we had plenty of other examples over the years, that you ask 
Governments to nominate and naturally they get rid of old Joe What-not that 
they’ve been wondering what to do about for years, and a good chance to 
pack him off somewhere and never hear of him again. So Arnold’s system 
was in fact to prowl about and get recommendations, ‘Oh, if you’re looking for 
a good economist, then so and so, if you can get him, would be very good.’ 
And then Arnold, who was forthright and business-like, would then ask for this 
person from the Canadian or the Australian or the Indian Government or 
whatever it was; and in some cases they were a bit resistant, obviously not 
wishing to lose a good person. But it was, I think, a very sound method of 
recruitment. We were so small, at least then, that you could not afford to carry 
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any dead wood at all, if you were going to get anything done. This system of 
asking for good people, that’s how Emeka Anyaoku came from the Nigerian 
Foreign Service.  
 
SO: And how Arnold Smith approached Patsy Robertson… 
 
GH: Yes, from Jamaica and so on. And so it was a very good system and 
secondly it was based on another important principle on which Arnold was 
absolutely insistent: that having joined you were the servant of the 
Commonwealth, not the servant of your Government. You were not a 
delegate of the Government of Jamaica or India or whatever; you were a 
member of the Commonwealth Secretariat. This was important as a principle 
and became a principle which he defended very tenaciously during the 
Biafran Civil War when the Nigerian Government at the time had deep 
suspicions about Emeka. We had to do all sorts of things to defend his 
position in the Secretariat. But Arnold would not give up that principle that you 
are an international civil servant, not the servant of your Government. I think 
that was vital. 
 
SO: I’ve seen the letter from the Nigerian Parliament Secretary of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs in Arnold Smith’s papers, basically 
issuing a recall of Emeka Anyaoku, saying that he was not the Nigerian 
delegate to the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
 
GH: Yes, that’s right.  
 
SO: And the extent to which Arnold Smith robustly defended Emeka’s 
position. 
 
GH: Well, it was running battle for some time. At one stage, I think Arnold sent 
Emeka off to supervise the Gibraltar Referendum, just to keep him out of the 
way. But in the end as you say, Lagos actually demanded his return and 
Arnold refused. And was quite right. And I think that’s the key to running a 
proper international organisation. 
 
SO: As Special Assistants were you ever required to go forth and identify 
possible excellent recruits on Arnold Smith’s behalf? I’m just thinking of 
the diplomatic crises - you mentioned Rhodesia – which were piling up; 
so how much time and energy could he devote to recruitment? 
 
GH: Well, recruitment certainly was subject to the immediate issues. The first one 
which he had just tidied away when I arrived, was over the entry of Singapore 
to the Commonwealth. The Malaysian/Singapore unhappy divorce had 
occurred at the beginning of August ’65, and obviously both of them were 
prime Commonwealth members but Singapore as the newly independent 
country had to apply. And it was no problem as far as I can remember with 
Malaysia or other Commonwealth members, but Prime Minister Bhutto in 
Pakistan declined to agree and this posed a tricky constitutional issue, that as 
far as I know had never arisen in the Commonwealth, could one member 
veto? You know, like a club, one blackball would wipe out a membership 
application, and it would have been, as you can imagine, quite absurd if 
Singapore were not to be a member and very demoralising for them. Things 
were bad enough with the suddenness of the divorce. Arnold had a real 
creative mind on this sort of thing and there was a lot of ringing around. I do 
remember him ringing Bhutto several times; ringing around, he got agreement 
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that he would announce there was a consensus for Singapore’s membership 
and he would make a private note that Pakistan disagreed with the 
consensus. So we got over that one. But as you say, there were enough 
serious diplomatic challenges that though recruitment was essential it rather 
took second place to the immediate challenges. I can’t recall either Michael or 
I recommending people; only one or two people we did know and we would 
give our opinion on.  Arnold got some very good advice I think from Joe 
Garner, Sir Saville Garner, the Head of the Commonwealth Office then, who 
was an invaluable source of support in those early days. 
 
SO: I’m just looking at my list of early Commonwealth Secretariat 
appointees, so I know that Tony Aston was there, as well as Yaw Adu.  
 
GH: Yaw was the key one. Tom Aston was from the Foreign Office; he became 
Head of the Political Division that didn’t exist apart from Tom in the early days 
but that was his role and he was a British Foreign Service Officer. Yaw was 
the key man. He was well known in the Commonwealth; he had been 
Secretary General of the East African High Commission which ran railways 
and postal services and so on for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, or 
Tanganyika as it was then. And he had been Nkrumah's Secretary of External 
Affairs in Ghana but had left. I can’t recall the detail of Yaw’s recruitment. He 
certainly was recruited unseen because we picked him up when Arnold and I 
went to East Africa in November ’65, and we met Yaw there. He was a 
remarkable man and I think an absolute necessity in those early days. He had 
very sound judgement, a lot of experience, and was a ‘people person’; he 
knew people, liked people and around the Commonwealth people warmed to 
him. He certainly played a vital part in the early days for the mediation of the 
Biafran civil war. 
 
SO: Just thinking of whom else was there at the same time, on this list I 
have DSG Economic and Social, TE. 
 
GH: Tilak Gooneratne from Sri Lanka, it was Ceylon in those days. He was the 
other Deputy. Yaw was from Ghana but he was the political deputy and so 
tended to be more, at least in those early months, in the limelight. 
 
SO: And then also I’ve got Economic Affairs the Division, Sen Gupta. 
 
GH: Yes, he was from India. Nirmal Sen Gupta. 
 
SO: So these were all headhunted by Arnold Smith?  
 
GH: Well, as far as I remember. I can’t authoritatively say, they certainly weren’t 
headhunted by anybody else. I wasn’t involved in the process. And Arnold 
had good diplomatic contacts. He relied a lot on Canadian suggestions from 
his own people and so on. But he did headhunt, wherever possible. He didn’t 
head-hunt Tom Aston, I mean you know if the British Government said, ‘We’d 
like this chap,’ then you’re not going to say ‘Oh, I don’t know. I’ll have to look’, 
and Tom was very good. The Commonwealth Office did their bit. It was in 
their own interest to get a good person (in the Secretariat) and they did. 
Otherwise, I really don’t know where Arnold got his recommendations but he 
did, on the whole, insist that he had to have lined up someone himself, rather 
than accepting Government suggestions. And he had to be careful to keep a 
reasonable geographical balance across the Commonwealth, though he was 




SO: Patsy once told me that there was a general joke that every time Arnold 
Smith went off to have coffee outside Marlborough House, he came 
back with another Division. 
 
GH: Yes, we did grow very fast. But the exciting thing for me, at any rate, of that 
first year was there was no bureaucracy or even a proper filing system; we 
were so small. 
 
SO: Well, you had an administrator, Mr Abbey. 
 
GH: Yes, we had him. Oh, we had good people on the administrative side; I mean, 
the rent was paid and so on, but there was no elaborate bureaucracy, 
clearance of documents or anything, you were moving on your feet all the 
time. I spent a lot of my time drafting, sketching what Arnold needed in cars, 
aircraft and all places. But it was exhilarating that you weren’t, certainly for a 
young man of my age, passing paper up the chain of command and so on. I 
was in and out of Arnold’s office all day long and we just scribbled things 
down and said ‘Yes, let’s do this’ and I found that absolutely exhilarating. 
There was no alternative to operating this way because the challenges were 
crowding in on us, particularly the main one the Rhodesian crisis which might 
have ended the Secretariat at birth. And we had to react with what we had as 
best we could. 
 
SO: So what was Arnold Smith’s working style? Was he somebody who 
liked to rely a lot on the telephone? Did he delegate? I have been told by 
others he was a very charismatic and thoroughly colour blind diplomat. 
Personal charisma and good humour I think are key personal aspects 
that can enhance anyone’s diplomatic skills. 
 
GH: Very much so. I wonder whether the Secretariat in those early critical years 
would have survived if it hadn’t had Arnold as Secretary General, I really do. 
By the oddity of the luck of the fight over McIntosh, the Secretariat got the 
Secretary General which it absolutely needed. I’m not sure that there were 
plenty of people in the British Government including Harold Wilson, who 
would agree with me then or perhaps later. Arnold was a big personality, a big 
ego, but in a good sense. Vigorous, very energetic, pushy I think in the eyes 
of certainly some in the Commonwealth Office or the Foreign Office, but what 
I saw was moral courage. His combination of energy, ideas and moral 
courage, I think, were vital. By moral courage, I mean that whenever trouble 
arose or some Commonwealth Head of Government said they were going to 
leave the Commonwealth, Arnold had no hesitation in ringing or we were in 
the air travelling there; and so to speak, tactfully but firmly berating them for 
making the wrong or leaning towards the wrong decision and telling them why 
they were wrong - courteously, diplomatically but firmly. And I think that with 
someone without that moral courage the new institution might have been 
stillborn or not survived for long. It was uncomfortably close to disintegration, 
as you know, at some points in the Rhodesian crisis. So I think Arnold’s 
bounce, energy, willingness to try ideas and his moral courage and 
willingness to wade into trouble was crucial. I remember, and I think I may 
have said, he had a word with Harold Wilson, quite firmly, saying that these 
endless negotiations with Ian Smith were doing a lot of damage to the 
Commonwealth. He told Lester Pearson (he was quite friendly with Pearson 
who was then Canadian Prime Minister), ‘I felt I had to stick my neck out’ and 
Pearson said, ‘You certainly stuck it out alright!’ And I think Pearson was 
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delivering a bit of a warning. That he had been talking to Wilson and Wilson 
was pretty cross. Though he no doubt took note of it, Arnold Smith was not 
frightened by that sort of thing and if he had been the thing wouldn’t have 
worked. 
 
SO: I know from looking at the Founding Memorandum, the idea was that the 
Secretary General should be of the same standing as a Senior High 
Commissioner; but Arnold Smith was very much a large personality 
moving into the rank of a Foreign Minister, with his willingness to talk to 
Heads of States one on one, rather than in any sense of hierarchy and 
deference. 
 
GH: Very much so, in fact nothing annoyed Arnold more than for someone to 
quote from the Memorandum, ‘You should be behaving, Secretary General, 
like a Senior High Commissioner.’ His temperament, his personality would not 
accept that and he was right. Whether it was a fact of his own big personality, 
it was right for the job. He would go and talk to Jomo Kenyatta one to one or, 
Nkrumah, or Julius Nyerere or whoever; and as you say, not as ‘I come here 
as a Senior High Commissioner’, but ‘I’m here speaking for the 
Commonwealth. I want to hear your views and I want to tell you what you 
know I’ve learnt as I’ve gone around.’ It was that one to one approach that I 
think was crucial in the crisis. It never occurred to Arnold to treat it otherwise; 
it would never have occurred to him to regard himself as a Senior High 
Commissioner. In fact, the thing that used to madden him quite unreasonably 





GH: And that was a terrible faux pas! I remember once we were in a television 
studio and he was doing something for the BBC and they had a rolling sign 
that said ‘And now we talk to Mr Arnold Smith, Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat’, whereupon the whole programme stopped. The 
cameras stopped rolling while Arnold insisted on it being corrected to 
‘Secretary General of the Commonwealth.’ That was a minor and mildly 
laughable quirk, but which shows you that Arnold had a sense of his 
importance which, I think, was very important to make the system work. The 
Commonwealth after all had and has as its great advantage, a degree of 
informality that other international institutions don’t have. Using this common 
language and other traditions has always met for more informality; and it 
meant, I think, that the Secretary General needed to be informal too in dealing 
with Heads of State, or Heads of Government or whatever and Arnold had 
that knack. 
 
SO: Did he in any way draw on other institutional models, say the Secretary 
General of the UN? Or, was he drawing particularly upon his close 
political friendship with Lester Pearson as a significant ‘backer’, or a 
larger power within the Commonwealth, even though Canada regarded 
itself as very much a middle power at that time? I was just thinking what 
other institutional models he might have used, what other political 
resources could he draw on? 
 
GH: I don’t think the UN struck him as a relevant model. I don’t think he felt there 
was anything from U Thant or whatever that was useful. The Commonwealth 
was a different sort of organisation and indeed one of the things he was 
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anxious to do was to prevent it going down the UN path, with the resolutions 
and formal debates and so on. Losing that degree of frankness and 
informality which was the Commonwealth’s great strength. So the UN was not 
the way to go. Lester Pearson was important for him; there’s no question. 
They had known one another for years, and I think Pearson’s advice and 
support was quite important to Arnold. It was given very discreetly and there 
was no sense of Arnold being in the Canadians' pocket. But Canada was 
after all the second biggest member of the Commonwealth, and so it was 
important. And when, for example, we were dealing with the Biafra when it 
came to putting together a potential peace-keeping force to reassure the 
Biafrans and being able to talk to Pearson and get Canadian troops in the mix 
straight away was the kind of help that Arnold always felt he could get from 
Pearson. 
 
SO: Did you ever have the sense that Arnold Smith was a Cold Warrior? This 
is a slightly tangential question, but I’m very aware that this was the 
mid-late 1960s: the international system and its international structures 
were not just shaped by the United Nations, but this was also the 
context of the Cold War? 
 
GH: No, I don’t think so. It was the background to everything you did in diplomacy 
obviously. But I don’t think it was of immediate interest to Arnold. It didn’t 
impact on the problems we were dealing with in Africa and so on, except as 
part of the background. He had of course served two terms in the Soviet 
Union - one during the war and the last time as Ambassador. He spoke some 
Russian; he liked Russians very much. I’m not sure that he greatly cared for 
their government, but he liked Russians and of course he had a very good 
collection of early pre-revolutionary Russian art. Such a good collection that 
he couldn’t afford to insure it. And he looked at the insurance costs in London 
and he thought well, it’s better if they’re all stolen than paying that sort of 
money! But he certainly didn’t see himself as working to reduce Russian 
influence or anything like that. I don’t think that was seen by him ever as 
relevant. 
 
SO: So was he really a reflexion of non-alignment at that particular time? 
 
GH: He had a strong, almost evangelical, moral compass and he privately 
repudiated non-alignment on the grounds you can’t be non-aligned between a 
good system and a bad one, but it just wasn’t relevant. We were dealing with 
a different set of issues. If we’d discussed it and I suppose we did, we’d have 
had what you might say were conventional Western views on it. But it wasn’t 
relevant in the working day, if you know what I mean. 
 
SO: Totally, because as you say, the area and realm of your work was not 
expressly connected to big issues of the nuclear arms race or 
disarmament. 
 
GH: No, the Commonwealth couldn’t really help on that. It liked to discuss them at 
Heads of Government meetings, but it was not a direction that the 
Commonwealth could take and certainly from that point of view, Arnold had 
no great interest in these as issues where he could contribute something. 
 
SO: You made a point about President Bhutto trying to blackball Singapore 






SO: And you used the word ‘consensus’: that there was consensus in the 
Commonwealth, but he would register that Pakistan effectively was a 
dissenter from that consensus. So can we look to Arnold Smith as the 
originator of this idea of establishing a working consensus? 
 
GH: Well, I think so because I think that was the first time the term had ever been 
used; before countries had joined the Commonwealth by acclamation, 
everybody agreed. He couldn’t say that this time because of Bhutto’s 
objections and so the word was ‘consensus’ and it of course became, as you 
would know, increasingly important working by consensus in the 
Commonwealth. As far as possible he did consciously aim to avoid votes. His 
argument was the Commonwealth doesn’t work by votes; you don’t vote 
things down or vote them up. We get or form a consensus and the advantage 
of the term ‘consensus’ means that if there are two or three diehards who 
won't move, you can say ‘Okay, the consensus is that we do this, we 
understand that you are not in favour of it,’ but not a vote and I think that was 
part of the way in which you might say face was saved. 
 
SO: And egos were managed? 
 
GH: And managed; and business got done without splits and all the excitements 
that otherwise might have appeared in the press. 
 
SO: That is very consciously not going the UN route, with the 5 permanent 
members of the Security Council having that veto that you made 
reference to. 
 
GH: Yes. That was part of the reason why we certainly did not take the UN as a 
major model for the Commonwealth; we had different lines of development 
and that was one of them. 
 
SO: Aha. You also made reference of Arnold Smith very consciously using 
the persona and the authority of his office that he was claiming, to 
assert that you were servants of the Commonwealth. How far do you 
think he was consistently, consciously, driving through this is a modern 
Commonwealth? This is not the British Commonwealth? 
 
GH: Oh, very much so. That was his message. When I went out with him on his 
first tours in 1965 that was his great message to every head of government, 
and head of state that we called on was to say ‘The Commonwealth is now in 
common ownership. It is not a British club, it is not run by the British; it is run 
by all of us.’ And that I think was the key message and I think a message he 
managed to get across in the heat of the Rhodesian UDI. He finally convinced 
a lot of Commonwealth heads of government that the association wasn’t a 
sort of stalking horse for British diplomacy, that it was in fact in common 
ownership. And that was critical to its survival and Arnold was very blunt in 
emphasising this. He was a clear and forthright speaker; he didn’t mind 
saying the same thing 5 or 6 times over, but he got his message across and 
that boldness with which he approached any sceptical head of state. He didn’t 
lecture them; he was much more tactful than that, but nonetheless they got a 
brief lesson in the way the Commonwealth had changed and why it was 




SO: Please, if I could come on now to the issues and events – ‘Events, dear 
boy, events’, as Harold MacMillan would say. Arnold Smith had been 
confronted in 1965 by a war between India and Pakistan; then 
immediately the Rhodesian UDI issue erupted, which had been bubbling 
up in 1964-1965. In fact, you say in your memoirs, that an African head 
of state identified this was going to happen a month before the actual 
declaration of UDI on 11 November 1965. 
 
GH: That wasn’t a head of state; it was a very dubious character from Zambia who 
we had dark suspicions was in fact a Rhodesian undercover agent. He kept 
coming to see us and you got a lot of cranks and oddities in those early days 
and perhaps always! You had to see a lot of them because you never knew 
which ones might be useful; and this chap whom we had great doubts about 
said he thought there would be a UDI in a month’s time. And he was spot on, 
to the day. So either he was very lucky or he did so because he had inside 
knowledge. But at that stage Arnold had told Garner at the Commonwealth 
Office that he was thinking of an introductory tour to Central and East Africa 
at the end of November and Joe Garner said to him, ‘I think you should bring 
it forward’. So with this and hints from this dubious chap and other people, 
Arnold left about three weeks early and picked up Yaw Adu in Kenya and, 
well you know the rest from my memoirs! But in fact the timing was 
providential because the explosion of wrath in independent Africa was very 
great, as you can imagine, and we were on the spot, jumping from country to 
country to make this argument, ‘Use the Commonwealth. Don’t pull out of it. 
You’ve got a weapon that you can use if you disagree with the British. Here’s 
your loud speaker, use it.’ Had we not been there, well it would have been 
interesting; so I think that was providential. Needless to say, the British 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Arthur Bottomley, had urged us 
not to go saying it was premature; but Garner, its permanent Head and a very 
sensible man, said ‘Go.’ And so we went. 
 
SO: Had you been in touch with the Rhodesian High Commissioner in 




SO: Obviously Rhodesia was not formally in the Commonwealth because it 
was still a quasi-colony at that point, following the break up of the 
Central African Federation. 
 
GH: No contact with Rhodesia or Rhodesia House at all. 
 
SO: I know you made reference in your memoirs, that Jomo Kenyatta was 
much more moderate.  
 
GH: Yes, he was. 
 
SO: Was this, do you think, a product of having fought the British in the Mau 
Mau emergency, so he had an awareness of the casualties and cost of 
war? 
 
GH: In effect he said it was. I mean, not in so many words, but quite clearly 
indirectly, yes.  He said ‘I know that it’s better to avoid violence if possible'. He 
said, ‘Of course it will take longer, but economic sanctions will do less 
damage in the long run than war’; and he is yet to be proved wrong on that. I 
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found him very impressive. I met him twice with Arnold and both times I was 
enormously impressed with Kenyatta. A very heavy dignified man with, I 
thought, a very good grasp of human nature and affairs. He clearly was 
delivering a message which was not welcomed by his Foreign Minister or 
other members of his Cabinet. The excitement was intense in Nairobi when 
we were there the day after UDI, and Kenyatta was quite clearly laying it 
down, ‘We will not be taking a military approach to this’, and of course his 
word was law and stuck. But I thought he was right. The other person whom I 
found very eerie, but on whom I’ve come around to in my older age to change 
my views a bit was Hastings Banda in Malawi. 
 
SO: That sounded a very strange encounter in your memoirs. 
 
GH: It was very strange! Leaving aside the strangeness of his arrangements and 
wiping the foam from his mouth. 
 
SO: You describe the room as extremely dark and … 
 
GH: Yes, all the curtains were drawn; it was as hot as hell. We sat in a sort of sun 
porch in his little house and all the curtains were drawn, presumably because 
he was afraid of assassination. There was a large brick wall around the house 
anyhow. But he stepped into the room where we were sitting waiting, with a 
bit of sunlight glinting through some of the curtains, in a thick black suit, black 
waistcoat and watch chain, dressed more like an Edinburgh doctor - which of 
course he had been. But for somebody in that climate? As you know, he 
invited us to a public hanging which was very unnerving. Banda though, to 
come back to the point, was more forthright that Kenyatta. He said, ‘I know 
the British very well. I’ve known them since before 1923 when Rhodesia was 
(a crown colony). He said, ‘I think it is much better to leave it to them. They 
will do it better in the long run and I don’t think other countries should be in 
the business of interfering.’ I was a young man of 28 or something, so I was 
appalled at this dreadful reactionary view but I have wondered in the light of 
the subsequent history whether his advice might have been better. Given the 
miserable state that Zimbabwe has ended up in, at least I hope temporarily, 
that puts Banda's advice in a somewhat different light. In that sense Banda 
may have been right, but there was no chance of that being politically 
possible. Quite apart from my own personal deep disapproval, nobody was 
going to agree with that approach. But I was interested that he and Kenyatta, 
and I wouldn’t say the two agreed, Kenyatta would certainly have not put it 
that high. Nonetheless the two older more experienced men perhaps had a 
cooler eye on how to manage it. The problem was, and it’s hard I think for us 
to understand now why people were so worried, the feeling really was that the 
apartheid regime was a kind of leprosy that was spreading North from South 
Africa. Now Southern Rhodesia had gone, Malawi looked as if it could be 
controlled, and would Zambia be next? What would happen to Kenya and so 
on? It didn’t to my eye then seem to be a plausible fear but it was certainly 
there. 
 
SO: But Wilson certainly made reference to that. He feared Rhodesia was 
lost, and South Africa would expand its control.  
 
GH: Well the fear was there and it strongly influenced reactions to UDI. I was 
struck by the oddity when I was first in Zambia after UDI that all the 
Rhodesian small goods, soft drinks and minor consumer goods had all 
disappeared - only to be replaced by South African toothpaste, toothbrushes 
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and all that sort of thing. It was a sign and people like Milton Obote did feel 
that they were being slowly swallowed up. He said to us, ‘Malawi’s still there, 
but its soul has gone.’ I remember him saying that they were being eaten from 
within by Apartheid; so I think the fierceness of the reaction reflected that 
feeling that this sort of leprosy was spreading unstoppably like a disease, and 
only very brisk action by Britain would have stopped it. 
 
SO: Well, it’s almost a Cold War analogy, isn’t it. The comparison to 
apparent creeping Soviet-led socialism. I’m just thinking of the advance 
into Eastern Europe in the late 1940s; that’s a direct contemporary 
reference point. 
 
GH: Yes, the advance into Eastern Europe was of course with the Soviet Army, 
which helps. But the South African army was already in Namibia. Well it 
wasn’t called Namibia then but yes, I mean the fear of South Africa’s 
economic power primarily, but also its military capabilities. South Africa was 
still the most powerful military state in the continent. So the fear was very 
strong, and Arnold got from Nyerere and Obote, ‘We’ll have to leave the 
Commonwealth if this goes on.’ And by the end of Arnold’s trip when we left 
Tanzania, it was still in the balance; but I think we both came away with the 
feeling that there wouldn’t be mass departures from the Commonwealth 
which had seemed very likely at the beginning. 
 
SO: From what you observed, would you say that these African Heads of 
State were very much in control of their country’s foreign policies? That 
they were the arbiters and key drivers of foreign policy? 
 
GH: Very much so. It’s become a fact around the world and in our own countries, 
the Prime Minister now effectively runs foreign policy, I think everywhere; and 
that was certainly the case then with Nyerere, with Kenyatta, with Kaunda, 
and so on. So they were the people we saw. Often they had their Foreign 
Ministers with them. But the deciders were the Presidents or Prime Ministers. 
 
SO: Yes, so it’s really the discussion within the Prime Minister’s office, with 





SO: And so a Foreign Minister was to deal with day to day stuff? 
 
GH: Yes, that’s right. 
 
SO: You mentioned Milton Obote: how good a Commonwealth Head was he? 
How committed was he to the Commonwealth? Obviously Kenneth 
Kaunda and Julius Nyerere had an increasing significance through the 
‘70s and particularly the early ‘80s, but Obote? 
 
GH: Well, Obote was extremely helpful to the Commonwealth Secretariat. I 
remember the first meeting with him on that visit maybe after UDI. And he 
said to Arnold, ‘I can see that the Commonwealth is no longer run by the 
British but it still looks to us like an English club’. Because of the UDI thing. I 
think that Arnold convinced him on that first visit. ‘Well, why not wait and see, 
why not give it a go before you write it off’, and he did. I think he was a 
convert because when the Biafran crisis came out, it was he who lent his 
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good offices when we finally had negotiations between the two sides. And he 
was extremely helpful. I mean we failed for other reasons but we certainly 
needed somebody like Obote as head of state to get us accommodation and 
push, and I think add some diplomatic bounce too. 
 
SO: Thank you. I was wondering why those negotiations on the Biafran war 
were in held in Kampala. 
 
GH: They were in Kampala by an accident. The two sides never engaged in direct 
talks; shuttling between the two sides was extremely trying and our main 
contribution was to be endlessly patient. We finally got them to agree to a 
meeting, but then they couldn’t agree on where to meet. The Nigerians said 
London, and the Biafrans said, ‘No, London is no good’, and they suggested, 
now I can’t remember what they suggested, and there was deadlock. They 
agreed to meet but we couldn’t get a meeting because we couldn’t agree 
where. And finally, Arnold said to them ‘Write down an alternative place 
where you could meet other than the one you’ve said you would prefer, on a 
bit of paper and give it to me.’ So they both wrote a short list and fortunately 
Kampala was on both lists, so we said Kampala. Arnold got on the phone to 
Obote and Obote said, ‘Sure’, and he was very helpful in facilitating the whole 
thing. So that’s how it came to be Kampala. 
 
SO: Staying on Biafra for a moment: did Arnold Smith use Emeka Anyaoku 
as a source of information in any way, or as a private envoy, given that 
he was also Igbo, from Nigeria? 
 
GH: Because he was Igbo, definitely not. I think in the beginning before the split 
came, before the secession, as Colonel Ojukwu became increasingly 
important, Emeka was helpful among others in keeping Arnold briefed on how 
the situation was developing. The moment it became a crisis of secession, 
Arnold could not use Emeka without compromising his integrity as a 
Commonwealth civil servant, so our main role with Emeka was to protect him 
and keep him, so to speak, away from the subject so we didn’t use him after 
that. Of course initially Arnold relied very heavily on Yaw Adu who made a trip 
to West Africa and came back and reported very sensibly and accurately and 
very pessimistically; and Yaw was well known in the whole of West Africa 
obviously. So he was our initial point of contact. Afterwards of course it was 
Arnold himself once we got into mediating - you might like to talk about that 
later on. 
 
SO: Yes, I would very much like to because I’m enormously struck by Arnold 
Smith’s energies and his input into trying to resolve the Nigerian civil 




SO: As well as the humanitarian crisis in Biafra and how that affected his 
subsequent political approaches. 
 
GH: His energy and his boldness were, I can’t keep saying it often enough, truly 
remarkable and absolutely essential in this early stage. Because you’ve got to 
remember the Secretariat was hardly known by anybody, ‘Commonwealth 
Secretary? Who’s he?’ Arnold had to build the job and he did and he built it as 
a senior, as you say, foreign minister sort of job. And people teased him for 
his ego and his sense of importance. I don’t know how much of it was self-
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importance, but the point was it was critical to getting the institution 
recognised and accepted as something that you could deal with. And for that I 
think he was irreplaceable. 
 
SO: Why was U Thant so resistant to the United Nations getting involved? 
 
GH: I don’t know the answer to that. We puzzled about it quite a lot. Arnold would 
go to see him a couple of times in New York and talk it over. Arnold got the 
impression that U Thant felt that it was being handled by the Commonwealth 
and he had other things on his mind and he had no need to get involved. For 
want of any better explanation, that still seems to me to be the best. He 
certainly liked to be briefed and kept informed, but he had no interest in 
playing any part. But on the other hand, Arnold did have a role, and I suppose 
U Thant would have had to push him aside if he wanted to be more active; 
nor was there any particular advantage I think in the UN doing so. We weren’t 
short of active supporters when they needed peacekeeping forces and 
economic aid and all that, we could muscle that up within the Commonwealth 
if and when needed. Our problem was to get the two sides to agree and I 
don’t think the UN had any better ideas than we did on that one. 
 
SO: I’m very aware that the Biafra issue in fact had Cold War angles to it, 
that France and Britain were very much at odds over the conflict; South 
Africa and the Ivory Coast also had their own fingers in this particular 
pie; and so it wasn’t simply an intra-Commonwealth issue, a civil war 
within the Commonwealth. It did have much wider international 
ramifications. 
 
GH: Oh, it did indeed. I mean, the whole question of secession was a difficult and 
confusing one for many countries. But the issue of Biafra was less Cold War 
and more entangled with arbitrary colonial boundaries and above all, oil. That 
caused the trouble. I remember when oil was found in the river states in 
Nigeria before the Biafran crisis and Yaw Adu said to me ‘Oh I’m very sorry to 
hear they’ve struck oil in Nigeria’ and I said, ‘Come now, Yaw! You mustn’t be 
jealous, you know. It’s their good fortune.’ 
 
SO: Rather than Ghana? 
 
GH: Yes. Yaw said, ‘You misunderstand me. Oil is trouble. They’re going to have 
trouble’ and he was right. Any time I remonstrated with Yaw, he was always 
right and I was wrong.   
 
SO: Did Arnold Smith make any approaches to Paris, to try to ring-fence the 
discussion in any way? 
 
GH: No, I think he stuck pretty closely to his Commonwealth brief. I can’t recall. 
Occasionally people, possibly the French Ambassador certainly other 
ambassadors, would come around for a briefing. I certainly remember being 
asked to dinner by the Papal Nuncio who wished to be briefed on it, in the 
cautious way of papal diplomacy, at his house in Wimbledon. And Arnold’s 
position was that, barring more sensitive things, he was perfectly willing to 
brief anybody who wanted to know what we knew about the crisis; but he 
certainly didn’t go out of his way, and nor did he have time. It wasn’t a 





SO: What about Arnold’s relationship with the Foreign Office and Number 10 
on the Biafran issue? 
 
GH: I have to go wider than that. The initial relationship was sensitive. I think, not 
so much the Permanent Under Secretary of either the Foreign Office or the 
Commonwealth, there were two in those days who I think were large-minded 
and understood what were the changes that would work. There was 
considerable… I think, jealousy’s too strong a word, but resentment and wry 
laughter at, you know, these amateurs in the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
because in a sense we were doing the Commonwealth Office out of an 
important part of their job. So that was understandable. There was nothing 
nasty or anything but just occasional signs of resentments. With Number 10, 
the relationship varied. I think Harold Wilson recognised in Arnold a kind of 
formidable partner who might well be difficult to control, as indeed he was. So 
I think their relationship did fluctuate; I think Wilson, although much criticised 
over various things, on the whole was extremely helpful to the way the crisis 
developed in the Commonwealth. When, as a result of UDI, the pressure 
mounted for an early Commonwealth meeting in Lagos (January 1966), 
Wilson’s immediate reaction was to say ‘Yes, I’ll go.’ And that was quite a big 
thing. He had reservations about it afterwards; he said, ‘You know, I’m not 
going to be put in the dock’. But his decision to say ‘I’ll be there,’ made that 
meeting a goer. And I think it was very important that meeting, to provide a 
vent for the resentments, the fears, what are the British up to? And so on. 
 
SO: So it was a safety valve really, to blow off steam? 
 
GH:  I think it was a way of people doing what the Commonwealth does best, 
talking among themselves, getting a better grip on how other people saw it 
and what possibilities there might be. I think with hindsight, everyone was too 
optimistic at that stage. Certainly Wilson was a brilliant man, attractive in that 
sense, but he was convinced that sanctions would bring Southern Rhodesia 
to their knees and managed, I think, to convince the meeting in Lagos that 
given six months or so, it should do the trick. I’m not sure the meeting entirely 
agreed with him but I think they were prepared to take him at his word and 
give him six months. Later on that trust evaporated and there was rising 
suspicion that Wilson might do a deal with Ian Smith and abandon Rhodesia 
to white independent rule. 
 
SO: You write of that in your memoirs.   
 
GH: Yes, the pressure especially from the African members was to get Britain to 
rule out any possibility of independence before majority rule. So trust in 
Britain faded but in the early days I think there was a willingness to let Wilson 
have a go. 
 
SO: But still there were demands for British intervention. The calls for the 
use of force really were very loud indeed. 
 
GH: They were, they were. Wilson never hesitated on that. I remember him saying 
to Arnold ‘My cabinet would not. My cabinet are simply not in the mood for 
foreign adventures’. Among Wilson's advisers there was, I think, concern that 
a British invasion of Southern Rhodesia posed huge military risks and I don’t 
think it was ever considered seriously in London. But people like Kenneth 
Kaunda really felt that if the thing went on in six months, it would come to be, 
as we say now, ‘the new normal’ and everyone would have accepted that 
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Southern Rhodesia was run by the whites and that was that. And I think that 
his fears were to some extent realised. 
 
SO: How much was he, Kenneth Kaunda, also trying to defend himself 
against left wing criticism from people like Simon Kapwepwe? Was 
there also a fear that Zambia, as former Northern Rhodesia, had a black 
independent government but their legitimacy was also tied with their 
Southern Rhodesian colleagues acquiring independence at the same 
time? In other words, they felt, to a degree, morally cheated and 
compromised in their own acquisition of liberation? I’m just wondering 
if you felt that in any way permeated their thinking? 
 
GH: I don’t know. I don’t know about that. On the first point, Kaunda’s position as 
president although unchallenged, was not anywhere near as strong as 
Kenyatta’s or the others. And so his rather more fiery Foreign Minister, Simon 
Kapwepwe, was much more of an influence. When Kenyatta’s Foreign 
Minister disagreed with his president and the president said ‘Don’t’, he 
withdrew it. That was not so with Kapwepwe. You hinted that Kaunda was 
probably always looking at his left, but I don’t think his prime worry was 
internal politics, although that could obviously be part of it. I think his prime 
worry was that many in Zambia were so inter-connected with the Southern 
Rhodesians. 
 
SO: Yes, because of the Central African Federation’s infrastructure and 
political economy. 
 
GH: He couldn’t get his copper out or his oil in, except through Southern 
Rhodesia. When I was in Lusaka I found that even my telephone calls to 
London all went through an exchange in Salisbury. That was the first practical 
thing the Commonwealth could do, because Kaunda explained at really heart-
breaking length the extent of the ties and how crippled his country was going 
to be, he could not export. Zambia’s money was in copper and he couldn’t get 
the copper out. And it was going to run out of oil and so on. And as you know 
we worked out an arrangement for a Commonwealth airlift. 
 
SO: Yes. The British and Americans participated as well. There’s a lot of 
material in the British National Archives on this. 
 
GH: Yes, Canada and New Zealand, the British, the Americans others, Australia 
too I think. We had Hercules, I think, and they bought oil in and took copper 
out and got over the initial supplies problem; and that greatly eased the 
situation. We recruited from India a senior Indian civil servant to run the 
operation at the Lusaka end; and well, we got over that crisis.  
 
SO: Was that a Secretariat initiative?  
 
GH: Yes. Well, they asked us for help and we delivered. We got in touch with 
people and explained what was needed and then it was organised by several 
Commonwealth air forces. I was sent down by Arnold to Lusaka about 
Christmas time and we worked out a scheme. They gave me a list of what 
they needed and how much and when - all the details. We spent days sitting 
there. Kaunda's officials were very good at producing a comprehensive list of 
their needs. I took this back to London and we sent it around to Canada and 
the other Commonwealth members, and up came the aircraft and people 
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knew what to take in and what to take out; and it worked beautifully. And that 
was probably the first actual practical thing that we did come to think of it. 
 
SO: Well, the logistical planning needed phenomenal coordination. 
 
GH: Yes, it did. We did not coordinate the flights or anything like that as it wasn’t 
our business. But we got it going and circulated the list of what needed to be 
moved and the respective Commonwealth governments and air forces did the 
rest. 
 
SO: Yes, but by the September 1966 Commonwealth heads meeting, Harold 
Wilson was already starting to have the bilateral discussions with the 
Rhodesians that led to HMS Tiger talks later that year. 
 
GH: Yes, it was much more rocky. 
 




SO: But at this point, did Arnold ever venture a private opinion to you about 
how he felt that the British Government was handling this? 
 
GH: Oh yes, quite often. We assumed that Arnold's office was bugged which did 
not bother him at all. He felt that what he said informally in his office might 
have more impact on the British than his formal calls, and he could be relaxed 
about this because there were no discrepancies between his private views 
and what he said in Whitehall - they were couched in much the same words. 
 
            He was equally frank about raising it with Wilson when there was speculation 
about the coming Fearless talks. Arnold said - and I was there - to Harold 
Wilson, ‘We really need to break out of this autumnal routine of negotiations 
with Ian Smith’. Wilson was very cross. This was when Arnold said to Lester 
Pearson afterwards, ‘I stuck my neck out.’ He did. So, I think one of Arnold’s 
strengths was he did not, so to speak, pussy foot. He told Heads of 
Government, and particularly Harold Wilson, what he thought. Not 
gratuitously but when he thought it really required plain speaking. And I 
admired him for that moral courage. 
 
SO: Was he in touch with the Zimbabwean national liberation political 
elements at this particular time? 
 
GH: No, I mean they came to see us and I knew personally people like Bernard 
Chidzero, a very impressive man. We didn’t see it as our job to foment 
resistance in Zimbabwe. There were plenty of other people doing that. Our 
job was to maximise international pressure on the regime to get it changed; 
and that really came down, in practical terms, to trying to put the maximum 
effect of pressure on Britain to do the right thing. And I use the term 
‘maximum and effective’; both are important. Maximum pressure was not 
necessarily most likely to get the British Government to do what we hoped it 
would. So you had to make sure that your pressure was effective, something 
which elements within the British cabinet and within the British civil service 




SO: I know that in later years that Secretary General Sonny Ramphal had 
contacts with both ZANU and ZAPU. Obviously, between 1965-74 the 
Reverend Sithole and Robert Mugabe were incarcerated inside 
Rhodesia. At the Kingston CHOGM in 1975, which was Arnold Smith’s 
last CHOGM as SG, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo both attended 
and made an unofficial presentation to heads. Ramphal has told me he 
was keen to provide administrative and political support, and solidarity 
to both these liberation movements which then came together as the 
Patriotic Front in 1976 – this was both at the Geneva meeting in 1976, 
and behind the scenes at Lancaster House in 1979. I understand he was 
also willing to use private briefings of the British press to exert effective 
pressure on the British Government. I wondered if Arnold Smith was a 
forerunner of this particular SG technique? 
 
GH: Oh, I think he did. It’s a very delicate weapon to use; it’s a double-edged 
weapon and my boss McIntosh was good at it. I learnt and saw something of 
the art with him. Arnold did do it but very sparingly and very carefully. He was 
quite right, I think. He felt it was better that he talked to ministers rather than 
give them the impression that their arms were being twisted by stirring up 
public pressure, but we did of course have lots of contacts in the media. 
There were Commonwealth correspondents in all the quality newspapers in 
those days in London, and they came to see us a lot and got briefed. But I 
think not with any underhand intent, but just briefed, ‘This is what we know at 
the moment and you’ve asked for information and here it is.’ But I think it 
would not be fair to Arnold to say that he ran any kind of private campaign. 
 
SO: I wasn’t trying to suggest that Sonny Ramphal ran a private campaign, 
but he used all sources to exercise effective pressure. 
 
GH: Yes, well, I’m sure Arnold would when it was necessary, but I think he was 
pretty chary. The relations with Wilson and his cabinet were sensitive enough 
on this issue without orchestrating press criticism. If they had had the feeling 
that we were campaigning against them, then we’d have slipped backwards a 
long way. Arnold talked to the press quite a bit, but he tended to talk on the 
record, rather than off the record.  
 
SO: Was Arnold Smith also using other aspects, or other issues as a way to 
build up the positive role of the Secretariat, so that it would counteract 
any perceived negativity that the British Government had towards the 
Secretariat on the Rhodesia issue? Such as the Gibraltar referendum, or 
the Antigua constitutional issues, so that there were, as far as the 
British Government was concerned, some plus sides on the ledger?  
 
GH: Oh, very much so. And also I think he would argue very vigorously with 
Wilson and with George Thomson (a very able junior Minister in the 
Commonwealth Office) that the Secretariat was in Britain’s best interest in 
handling the Commonwealth; and that it provided Britain with ways and with 
safeguards that it wouldn’t otherwise have. So he certainly used that 
argument on the Rhodesian crisis itself but also, as you say, in lesser but 
useful fields, and that’s gone on ever since. 
 
SO: Yes. On the Biafran negotiations: after all the energy put into mediation, 
and the endless to-ing and fro-ing, it culminated in those thwarted 
Kampala discussions, which then broke up without any resolution. At 
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that point, did Arnold Smith ever despair of mediation and think that 
there was no role for the Secretary General of the Commonwealth? 
 
GH: Oh no, no, never.  But he must have, though he disguised it, he must have 
been heartbroken. We had come so close after two years of effort and the 
outlines of a possible compromise decision was staring everybody in the face; 
and it looked so do-able until Ojukwu pulled out. We could only speculate on 
why in the end he would not settle - perhaps he felt it too dangerous to him 
personally, perhaps he had gambled all on secession and felt fatalistically that 
he had to go down with the ship. It seemed to me that Arnold was in line for a 
Nobel Peace Prize if he had pulled it off.  But he was not a despairer. I’m sure 
he was upset, but he gave no outward sign even to me; I saw him all the time 
on that. So it was just that it hadn’t worked and maybe something else will 
work, although it was pretty obvious to us that after the Kampala effort - 
although we kept on, and kept in contact and writing to Ojukwu and so on - 
but it was pretty obvious that there was no game changer, that Ojukwu was 
going to fight on to the inevitable end. And that’s the problem I think, often 
with those situations. Successful mediation is very difficult to achieve. People 
say glibly that there should be a lot more mediation, but in fact it won’t work 
while either side thinks that they have a chance of getting what they want 
militarily. It only works when both sides have come to the conclusion they are 
not going to succeed, but they need a polite way to climb down. 
 
SO: It’s known as a ‘hurting stalemate’. 
 
GH: Yes. And then mediation can provide you with a dignified way out of the 
dilemma you’ve got yourself into. ‘Well, we’ve got a good deal in the end.’ We 
thought we had got to that point at some stages in the Nigerian civil war, but 
in the end it didn’t work.  
 
SO: Yes. Was there a particular Commonwealth dimension to the 
humanitarian relief attempts in Biafra?  
 
GH: Yes, there was. Well, there was very much a British one.  
 
SO: Yes.  I just wondered if there was a separate Commonwealth one that 
you… 
 
GH: No, there wasn’t a separate Commonwealth one. Again it was a terribly 
delicate issue. Arnold thought, in fact he said to me, ‘We might have pulled it 
off if we could have got into Enugu and seen Ojukwu.’ We couldn’t, because 
the Federal Government would not allow the Commonwealth Secretary 
General to go there. They regarded this as being a form of recognition which 
would be exploited by the Biafrans. I think they were over cautious, but I 
certainly feel that it was a considerable hamper in our efforts that we could 
not talk directly to Ojukwu, only to his negotiators who were nervous of 
Ojukwu and so we could never be sure of how frankly and accurately they 
reported back to him. 
 
SO: To what extent do you feel that those appalling images of the famine in 
Biafra were being used by Ojukwu as a highly conscious political tool, 
to break the blockade? 
 
GH: Well, they were certainly being used by the Biafran lobby in London. I am 
sceptical about the huge famine. I mean, there was chronic famine in the East 
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at certain times of the year and there is that disease ‘Kwashiorkor’, a 
malnutrition disease which gives children a very swollen belly; it’s a seasonal 
dietary problem. Anyhow, civilians suffer very badly in civil wars, there’s no 
question about that. But what struck me was that as the Federal troops 
advanced and other more independent observers came behind, there was no 
great sign of genocide or of mass killings or indeed mass deaths from 
starvation; and the big point for me was that when the secession was over I 
can’t think of two halves of a split country that have knitted together again 
more comfortably than those two did after it. Nigeria has other problems, big 
problems; it doesn’t have that problem anymore. So I think that the Biafran 
lobby, which was very active in London, as you may remember, was 
campaigning for a better political outcome. 
 
SO: I do.  
 
GH: And even here in New Zealand here, some people were protesting. I'm not 
sure how well-founded their views were but I think it probably prolonged the 
war. Not of course deliberately, but I think it did give the Biafran hawks - of 
which Ojukwu was one - the feeling that maybe they could yet get 
international aid if they could just hold on a bit more. Which wasn’t practical; 
nobody was prepared at that stage to give practical help. So the war fought 
itself out until the end. 
 
SO: Sir, if I could ask one question about the Commonwealth and South 
Africa at this particular point, before I ask you about the Technical 
Cooperation Fund.  How far was Arnold Smith also important in helping 
to lay the groundwork for the Commonwealth’s later grand strategy in 
opposing apartheid? Did you have contacts with the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement? Was there a beginning of scholarship assistance to South 
West African students, or contact with South African dissidents? I’m 
just wondering about the forerunners of Sonny Ramphal’s later 
campaign on apartheid? 
 
GH: Yes, Rhodesia was seen as the advance guard of the apartheid problem. But 
yes, we certainly had contact with what was then South West Africa’s 
emerging political leaders, including Sam Nujoma and others. We had 
contacts in South West Africa whom we saw from time to time and we did 
work to provide scholarships and so on. That sort of investment: I know it’s 
long term, but it’s really important. South Africa itself wasn’t a focus; it was the 
whole background of everything we did. But I couldn’t say that there was any 
need for the Secretary General to organise Commonwealth opposition to 
apartheid. It had it already. 
 
SO: I was going to say ‘it was alive and well’. 
 
GH: It was a question of, in a sense, preventing it from something totally 
dominating all Commonwealth meetings. People like Lee Kuan Yew, Keith 
Holyoake, then the New Zealand Prime Minister, and others got impatient that 
you couldn’t talk about anything else at Commonwealth meetings. They came 
all the way to London and there was only one subject. And that became an 
emerging problem. We had to adapt the structure to provide parallel 
discussions - one set of meetings on Southern Africa and another on other 
international issues including Vietnam, international aid and matters that other 




SO: Wilson had come up with the idea of a Commonwealth delegation to go 
to Vietnam at the London meeting in 1965. 
 
GH: Yes, it was not, I think, taken terribly seriously; it certainly was not taken by us 
very seriously. I went so far as to have some injections in case we had to go 
suddenly. I think it was probably more of a political gimmick. I mean again, I 
don’t quite see what use a Commonwealth delegation could possibly be to 
either the Vietnamese or Americans and it died almost in being born. But 
Harold Wilson did push it for a while. 
 
SO: But Nkrumah was quite keen. The minutes show this. 
 
GH: Yes. I don’t recall it ever being taken really seriously and I couldn’t at the time 
see what it was that we were supposed to be able to do. 
 
 
SO: So, when did you bring in these parallel discussions in 1969? At the 
London Commonwealth heads’ conference?  
 
GH: I think it was ’69. My memory’s a bit vague on that. 
 
SO: No, because there was an appreciable gap after the London September 
meeting in 1966. 
 
GH: We couldn’t meet again for a while after that. The September ’66 meeting was 
in a sense a disaster; not because of anybody’s fault or anything like that, but 
because the issue had become so explosive. Distrust of the British became 
so deep that rational, even-tempered discussion was no longer possible. I can 
remember Arnold talking about this after the meeting; he said ‘You know, we 
can’t meet again like this.’ When a year had gone by, more than a year, we 
looked at a meeting in Ottawa. But Pearson was not, as you can imagine, 
terribly interested in the possibility that the one Commonwealth meeting held 
in Ottawa might be the last meeting held by the Commonwealth anywhere! In 
the end we met in January ’69 in London. It was the depths of winter, the last 
meeting held in the long drawing room in Marlborough House, and still 
remembered years later by Lee Kuan Yew as being absolutely awful, stuffy 
and hot and pipe smoke all over the place. I’ve never had the courage to say 
to Lee it was mainly being contributed by me with an enormous pipe, sitting 
behind Arnold and smoking. But, as you know, it went a lot better and we got 
over it. But after September ’66, we really were not, I think, in a position to 
sensibly hold a meeting until something had changed to improve the feelings. 
 
SO: Sir, if I could ask you one last question before we stop for us both to 
have a break. About the Commonwealth Technical Cooperation Fund, 
its origins and its genesis. 
 
GH: Well, that is one of the practical things that I’m still very proud of having a 
modest involvement in. As far as I recall it, it was Arnold’s idea. Someone 
may have suggested it to him, but it was a genuinely new idea in international 
affairs.  International aid was a commonplace and developed countries would 
send experts and so on, but the point about the Commonwealth was there 
were a lot of countries, countries like Jamaica and others who had great 
hydrologists, soil scientists and so on, but who as governments were in no 
position to pay to send those hydrologists as aid to Africa or somewhere else. 
So the idea behind the technical cooperation arrangement was that we could 
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tap this hitherto unused source of aid expertise. Countries which could afford 
to pay would cover the costs of sending experts from those countries which 
had them but couldn't afford to provide them as aid. A brilliantly simple idea 
but one which hadn’t been tried before. And perhaps could only work in the 
Commonwealth because of the links of the language and so on. 
 
So you could say that a hydrologist from Jamaica could work in Pakistan and 
would be more effective more quickly than if you’d had a hydrologist from 
Armenia or somewhere.  So it was a simple idea and welcomed by 
Commonwealth governments and we had a meeting of Commonwealth 
ministers in Nairobi - I think it was ministers, certainly senior Commonwealth 
officials I can’t remember now which it was - and we thrashed out the outlines 
of how it would work. I sat up all night in my hotel room in Nairobi writing a 
memorandum of understanding to set out how the Fund would operate. I 
remember going out and standing on the balcony as the sun rose over 
Nairobi, having just finished it. 
 
SO: Was this the New Stanley or the Norfolk hotel?  
 
GH: It was one or the other, exactly; the only two Nairobi hotels I ever stayed. I 
think it was the New Stanley; it had a balcony. I would have been on the fifth 
floor or something like that. Standing there watching the sun rise and feeling 
absolutely exhausted, but feeling a considerable sense of satisfaction. I 
thought it looked good and workable. So I took the draft to Arnold and it was 
circulated when the meeting began at nine in the morning. I think I said 
something to explain how the document had been set out. Then I sat behind 
Arnold and fell fast asleep. When I woke up it had been adopted. And it has 
worked, it’s been a very distinctively Commonwealth contribution to the whole 
world of international aid. I’m no expert on how it’s worked in recent years but 
my hope was that it was more likely to get over problems of language and 
culture shock and so on than more general international contributions 
sometimes do.  
 
 
SO: Principal funding of course comes from the ABC countries, so again, 
I’m wondering the extent to which that this was Arnold drawing on the 
ideas of the Pearson Commission, with again a particular Canadian 
input? 
 
GH: He may have done. I can’t remember. He did recruit a Canadian economic 
adviser, Gordon Goundrey, to help run this. To what extent it had originally 
been a Canadian idea, I’m simply not qualified to give an opinion on. All I can 
remember is Arnold saying, ‘We’ve got to do something with this’ and we did. 
 
SO: Yes.  And so this would have been when, 1969? 
 
GH: ’68, I can’t remember. Yes, the record will tell you when. Tom Mboya, a very 
able Kenyan and minister chaired the meeting. I think I’ve got a photo of 
somewhere of Arnold and I and Mboya sitting at the table. He was later 
assassinated. 
 
SO: Yes, of course he was. He was shot on Government Road (now known 
as Moi Avenue), after leaving a pharmacy.  
 




SO: I lived in Nairobi for two years, in the mid 1980s; and I remember his 
death was still a strong memory and keen sense of loss. 
 
GH: Yes.  He was a loss, a real loss. 
 
SO: So, please shall we stop there?  
 
Part 2:  
 
SO: Sue Onslow talking to Mr Gerald Hensley on 2nd April, 2014.  Part 2.  Sir, 
I wonder if you could reflect please on your experiences and view of the 
Commonwealth after leaving the Secretariat. You went back to the New 
Zealand Foreign Service after the autumn of 1969. You must have been 
a rather different diplomat, having had quite so much autonomy in the 
Secretariat?  
 
GH: Yes, I think I was probably more than a little insufferable because I had 
acquired a lot of Arnold Smith’s outlook and probably a lot of Arnold Smith’s 
habits. So I may have had to be slightly depressurised at home, but I’m 
always grateful to Arnold, what he taught me about how to practice 
diplomacy. Diplomacy has a bad name for people being underhand, shifty 
and ‘lying abroad for the good of their country’ and all that sort of thing; but 
Arnold’s straightforwardness and energy seemed to me to be the key to 
successful diplomacy, and I’ve tried to follow it since. So I came back to the 
New Zealand Foreign Service and was posted to Washington but I did 
completely different work there. I was Counsellor and head of the Political 
Section of the Embassy and I had very little to do with the Commonwealth. 
And then subsequently I was posted to Singapore as High Commissioner and 
so I moved away; although I was on a visit to Ottawa at the time of the Ottawa 
Heads of Government meeting in ’71[1973?] and I was with my then Prime 
Minister, David Lange, in the Bahamas for the ’85 Commonwealth meeting. 
But then, let me go back, I was in Jamaica for the Commonwealth meeting 
in… 
 
SO: The Kingston CHOGM was in ’75. 
 
GH: 75, wasn’t it? which was Arnold’s last. I was there with my Prime Minister, Bill 
Rowling. A good meeting because you may remember the Oil Shock of ’73 
had dislocated the world economy quite seriously and there was much talk of 
the need for a New International Economic Order, with nobody quite sure 
what the new economic order would look like or how it would work.  And 
interestingly in my view, the Commonwealth meeting in Jamaica in ’75 was an 
important step in the way the international community came to terms with the 
economic problems we were facing as a result of the oil shock. There had 
been a huge amount of debate and the usual number of silly ideas and 
impractical proposals and all that which was part of any debate. But the 
Commonwealth meeting to my mind managed to sift the ideas to come down 
to a more sensible view of what might work. It set up a group of 
Commonwealth experts to report back to the Commonwealth heads of 
government. With major reports like this on the international economy years 
could have gone by with a doorstop report finally being produced in several 
volumes. Instead the Jamaica meeting said sensibly that, ‘We need an interim 
report before the Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting’ which was to 
take place in Georgetown in Guyana in a few months' time, and it thus 
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managed to abbreviate what otherwise might have been endless 
deliberations. The Commonwealth experts were chaired by Alistair MacIntyre, 
a very able Caribbean economist, and he came up with a very sensible set of 
recommendations within the deadline. For all the talk there had been about 
‘We need a radical new approach’, it took an orthodox approach and so was 
more likely to appeal to the major developed economies. It looked pretty 
much like the old international economic order, trusting to the IMF to recycle 
the Petrodollars to get the economy going again, as indeed happened. The 
report was adopted by the Commonwealth finance ministers at Guyana, I was 
there with my finance minister, and then was taken on to the special session 
of the UN General Assembly convened to discuss the crisis. The 
Commonwealth discussions were reflected in the Assembly debates by 
countries like Guyana and Ghana and it seemed that those discussions had 
in some silent way focused the discussion away from the wilder ideas and on 
to what could be acceptable to the wider international community. 
 
SO: The G77 confrontational approach? 
 
GH: Yes, down to what might be possible. It was helpful to rule out what had no 
chance of being implemented. What we ended up with was pretty much like 
the old economic order. There was the same need for international assistance 
and so on, but I think very sensibly grounded on trust in the IMF to recycle the 
Petrodollars, which it did. I feel that the outcome of that at the UN was very 
materially influenced by the preliminary Commonwealth discussions in 
Jamaica and subsequently at the Finance Minister’s meeting in Guyana. This 
was my view as one participant and I can’t say that I’ve looked into it all that 
closely ever since. 
 
SO: So, did you follow the debates about setting up a Common Fund? 
 
GH: Yes, I certainly did. I had in Jamaica a Prime Minister who was actually an 
economist. Unusual in prime ministers, and Bill Rowling was very sceptical 
about commodity funds and funds that attempted to stabilise commodity 
prices. He was quite right, and the Commonwealth experts group rubbished 
the idea. The remaining commodity agreements all broke down as a result of 
the crisis over liquidity, the Petrodollar problem, and demonstrated that 
stabilizing commodity prices are not the way to go. It’s better to provide aid if 
you like, through a common fund, than to try and stabilise coffee or wool or 
whatever prices. And I think that idea of commodity funds was killed in ‘75 
and quite rightly so. They never work, they didn’t work then and they don’t 
work now. That was I thought a step forward. As I say, some of the major 
steps forward that the Commonwealth pointed to in 1975 was what you 
couldn’t do. It wasn’t so much what you should do, but what wasn’t going to 
work. And a lot of impractical ideas went out. 
 
SO: What you’re identifying then is a practical relationship between 
West/South, rather than an antagonistic one between the major political 




SO: Or inter-governmental confrontation in the North/South dialogue. 
 
GH: Yes, you’ve put your finger right on it, because initially the reaction was 
confrontational North/South. The South were saying, ‘You’ve got to do a lot 
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more. Everything has changed and you’ve got to change with it’, and that sort 
of talk that you get in a crisis. What the Commonwealth discussions in 
Jamaica, but particularly I think the Alistair MacIntyre Commonwealth Group 
and the subsequent discussions in Georgetown Finance Ministers wasn’t was 
a North/South fight. It centred around ‘What can we do that will work and 
looks good to practical economists and is politically possible?’ That narrowed 
the debate but still left a lot to argue about. I think you’re absolutely right: it 
got us out of that sterile North/South argument. ‘It’s us against them, and 
them against us’ and so on. 
 
SO: Yes. What of, though, Malcolm Fraser’s input into this debate? I know 
he was politically close to Michael Manley, although ideologically they 
were poles apart: and they were both keen to stress Commonwealth 
development and this developmental angle of West/South. And I 
understand that they had a meeting in Runaway Cove in 1979; seven 
heads attended including the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt. 
It was all about re-correcting the international economic asymmetrical 
configuration. Sir Peter Marshall, when I spoke to him, emphasised that 
this idea of inter-governmental cooperation ran smack into the buffers 
at the World Summit in Cancun in 1981. So that although there may 
have been ideas towards an international developmental approach that 
was collaborative West/South, that in fact these ideas effectively 
petered out after Cancun? 
 
GH: I could well believe it. It’s beyond my area of knowledge. But what I do 
remember was I was a delegate at the UN Special Session and I was braced 
for a pretty angry North/South confrontation and it didn’t really happen. There 
had been admittedly a world debate, not just in the Commonwealth. There 
had been so much debate that a lot of the fire and one might say, the 
silliness, had got weeded out, but I do think that the Commonwealth’s efforts, 
perhaps by chance, because the Heads of Government meeting in Jamaica, 
the Finance Ministers meeting came before the UN special session and 
everyone had talked themselves out in the Commonwealth on it, and brought 
their views to New York. Therefore, my experience at that UN Special 
Session was much less confrontational and much more constructive than I 
had expected. We were talking from much more of a common platform than I 
had expected. And I do think the Commonwealth played an important part in 
that. Beyond that I can’t go because I was doing other things after that. 
 
SO: Thank you for that observation. Peter Marshall’s argument is very much 
that the Commonwealth was an important pilot fish in all sorts of ways, 
as an initiator, a platform of debate, because it was a smaller 
environment that enabled both frank discussion, but also practical 
outcomes. 
 
GH: That’s absolutely right on this and on other things too.  But on this very 
difficult economic question the middle of the ‘70s the Commonwealth did 
exactly that, and they did it because people spoke very frankly. I think not 
rudely, but they said what they thought. We didn’t get long speeches and not 
too much of ‘what my country is gloriously doing’, and so on. And a good 
chairman in a Commonwealth meeting was able to discourage a bit of a 
tendency to go off into UN-ish kind of talk. Anyhow, there was enough 
discussion and enough weeding out. A really good group of Commonwealth 
experts was put together - a serious group with that instruction, which I 
thought was critical to give us an interim report, because the real one would 
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have taken 8 years, and be old news. I think in that sense the ‘pilot fish’ role 
was rather important for the world as a whole. 
 
SO: So 10 years after that meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, you accompanied 
David Lange, your Prime Minister again, to the Commonwealth Heads 




SO: Ramphal was of course now SG. I understand you had met him when he 
was Attorney General of Guyana. 
 
GH: I also knew Sonny, yes. I (had first met him) at Guyana’s independence - at 
the time I went to Brazil by canoe, arranged by Sonny. So I did know him and 
I saw quite a bit of him on and off. At his request I chaired a Commonwealth 
officials group on the international economy at the Delhi meeting in 1983. 
 
SO: Was this New Delhi meeting of Commonwealth senior officials? 
 
GH: Yes, but we met to draft an economic statement while the heads of 
government were meeting.  
 
SO: In that eight year interval between the Kingston and New Delhi 
meetings, did you feel that the Commonwealth had become an 
appreciably different organisation, under a different head?  
 
GH: No, I didn’t. Maybe I should have. But my observations of the Commonwealth 
were very intermittent. From 1980 I was head of the Prime Minister’s 
Department and of course concerned with foreign policy, but also with 
domestic policy. So, my knowledge of the Commonwealth was fairly 
intermittent at that stage.  But in Delhi there was a desire for an economic 
declaration, and I was asked to chair the committee to draft it. But the 
Secretariat had a draft which nobody, including me, liked very much, so we 
only had a few hours to produce a new one. We went off into a room at the 
back of the main meeting while it was going on and I had an inspiration. I 
said, ‘Well, we won’t be breaking for lunch. We will have lunch when we have 
finished’. 
 
SO: I’ll bet that concentrated people’s minds! 
 
GH: I’ve had a lot of experience of Commonwealth communiqué drafting and the 
tendency of people to get bogged down in grammatical changes and minor 
alterations of sentences. So I said, ‘We’ll have lunch as soon as we have 
finished.’ So we worked away and by 3 o’clock miraculously we had reached 
agreement. We had lunch and I took it back into the meeting and the meeting 
adopted it. I do remember sitting behind my prime minister while the 
discussion was going on about adopting it and being touched on my shoulder. 
Turning around, I saw it was Lee Kuan Yew and he said to me, ‘It’s very good 
but it won’t make any difference, you know.’ Which was probably right. 
 
SO: I know Prime Minister Robert Muldoon had had extensive exchanges 
with Margaret Thatcher in the run up to that Delhi meeting, talking 
particularly about economic issues. Their correspondence is in the 




GH: Yes, he was much engrossed; that’s why I was asked to chair it, I think. He 
was much engrossed in the need for a New Bretton Woods, which took up a 
lot of his department’s time, drafting articles, speeches and so on for him. I 
was privately less convinced than he was, though of course loyally drafting 
away for him; but at the meeting with Mrs Thatcher, she said ‘Rob, the system 
will re-balance itself. We don’t need to make radical changes.’ She was right; 
it did re-balance itself, but there were a lot of people like Muldoon who did not 
think that it would. Oddly enough, the people who were most behind it were 
the leaders of Commonwealth developing countries. I remember Julius 
Nyerere saying to me, ‘I’m sorry now that I didn’t go to the Finance Ministers’ 
meeting.’  New Zealand had then been in considerable disgrace because of a 
rugby football tour by white South African players and as a result the Finance 
Ministers meeting was shifted from Auckland, much to Muldoon’s anger. But 
Julius Nyerere said to me and to others he was sorry he hadn’t gone, 
because he was now a great supporter of Muldoon because of his economic 
theories. And they played quite a part in the ’83 economic discussions. Those 
discussions were mainly taken up with the issue of the security of small 
Commonwealth states, as a result of the American intervention in Grenada, 
as you’ll know. But the economic one was the other big theme and the one on 
which the meeting adopted the Economic Declaration prepared by officials. 
 
In fact the system did re-balance itself, as we all know. But Muldoon certainly 
was very anxious to push the need for greater efforts, again, because of the 
effect on developing countries. He has a reputation, partly deserved, of being 
a bit of a monster; but he really did care about small countries. He cared 
about the Pacific islands; he never missed a Pacific Forum meeting. His 
theories on the need for a new Bretton Woods were really predicated on the 
need for the international community to do a lot more for vulnerable states 
than it was doing. And I think his motives were entirely pure and correct. I 
rather shared Mrs Thatcher’s views that a more practical way was in fact the 
way that happened, but that’s a matter of opinion.  
 
SO: Yes.  So what was Muldoon’s attitude towards the value of the 
Commonwealth then, as a platform for New Zealand foreign policy, as a 
way to enhance New Zealand’s standing in the international community, 
as a vehicle to achieve certain specific policy goals?  
 
GH: Well, it varied with the meetings. I went to two Commonwealth meetings with 
him. The first one was disastrous from our point of view. It was in ’81 in 
Melbourne. And he was in the dock over his stand on the Gleneagles 
Agreement and the South African football tour of New Zealand. He was an 
aggressive man when challenged, and he went to Melbourne in full 
aggressive mode, ready to punch in all directions. So it was really very, very 
difficult and not one of New Zealand’s better diplomatic moments. ’83 in Delhi 
- it was a different world. He was in a sense, greatly admired by Kenneth 
Kaunda and Julius Nyerere because of the economic arguments he was 
making and so the atmosphere was quite different.  No New Zealand prime 
minister then, or now, would miss Heads of Government meeting, so that 
speaks for itself, I think. It was not an option. Muldoon was not an idealist. He 
wouldn’t have had idealistic views about the Commonwealth. I think I actually 
did talk to him once or twice about it, but unless you were talking a practical 
problem that required action today, he wasn’t interested. He wasn’t a 
reflective man. And so that sort of conversation, at least between him and me, 
never took place over the four years I worked for him as head of his 
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department. But he clearly valued the Commonwealth. He liked that sort of 
meeting and he liked the chance to talk things over with other leaders. 
 
SO: Because it was a smaller venue? 
 
GH: Small and I think he liked the chance to talk separately to ‘Margaret,’ – as she 
was always referred to - and to others. I think more than the discussions 
during the morning and the afternoon sittings, it was the chance to mingle. 
 
SO: So the retreat sessions would be particularly valuable? 
 
GH: Yes, I think just in the corridors, just in that sort of thing. 
 
SO: Discussions on the periphery, as well. 
 
GH: That informality of the thing. I think he relished that. It was pretty obvious to 
me that he did find that valuable. He always said to me, ‘Oh, we’ll go and 
have a bit of a chat’ and I think from him that was high praise, I think he 
picked up ideas, and he tried out ideas. He was not a reader. He was a highly 
intelligent man but not a reader, not well educated. 
 
SO: So then that says that the Commonwealth Heads meeting is a way of 
exchanging global ideas?  
 
GH: Yes, I think it’s perhaps exchanging ideas about current problems. I have to 
say that Robert Armstrong, then Cabinet Secretary in Whitehall, introduced a 
custom at some of the ones that I was at, where while their prime ministers 
were having dinner with the Queen on the Britannia we - four of us, the 
Canadian, Australian, myself and Robert - would have dinner together in 
some restaurant. And this was enormously helpful, certainly to me and I think 
to others, because it was a lonely job being head of a prime minister’s 
department; and the only other people who knew what it was like were the 
other three people that were with me. So they’d say ‘Does your chap …?’ ‘Oh 
does he ever! Yes, of course’ and you realised, ‘yes, I’m not alone on this. I 
have the same problems.’ It was enormous fun but also to me a great help. 
 
SO: That suggests something of a senior officials group counselling 
session!  
 
GH: Yes, a group counselling and I think in a bigger way the prime ministers found 
the same thing. Obviously in a much wider group and more diverse, but my 
experience with good politicians is they make instant snap judgments of 
people, sometimes wrong but, more often than not, right; they have to make 
shrewd judgments otherwise you wouldn’t get to be a top politician. And they 
want to make those judgments about the new prime minister say of India, or 
of Pakistan, what sort of person is he or she like? The Commonwealth 
provided that sort of thing in the way the UN can’t easily do, because you’re 
meeting in more informal ways, chatting, sitting down together at dinner, 
having a cup of coffee in the break in the middle of the afternoon or whenever 
it might be, and forming those judgements which I think, certainly for my 
prime minister, he found very important. I didn’t always agree with his 
judgment; that’s of course a separate issue. But he made them and he made 
them because he was mixing and so on. I suspect that if I’d said to him, ‘What 
is the most valuable thing you get out of these?’ he’d probably say that was it. 




SO: So, the Commonwealth meeting environment was valuable for 
somebody whom you describe as an intuitive politician and who was 
using that personal chemistry and contact with Heads as a way of 
affirming ideas, establishing those bonds of trust, using the informality, 
the opportunity for a quick exchange of deep seated concerns? 
 
GH: That’s right. ‘Is this someone I can do business with?’ 
 
SO: Yes, exactly, to use Margaret Thatcher’s comment about Mikhail 
Gorbachev. 
 




GH: And that will influence your subsequent actions if you need them for 
something say, ’He or she is very good. I must have a word with them’ or, 
‘Well, no, I think maybe we won’t bother about that.’ Those sorts of 
judgments, I think, were made at those kind of meetings. This sounds all very 
black and white but it meant that when some issue came up later on, the PM 
would say ‘Oh yes, yes. I talked to her at Delhi and she had an interesting 
view on this so perhaps we should follow it up.’ - that sort of thing.  
 
SO: But was there ever any sense of ‘I’m facing a serious challenge. So and 
so made a comment that is now striking chords. I should find out what 
they privately thought or did about X’. Was it also a problem solving 
environment in any way?  
 
GH: It could be. And in our case in ’81 the problem was insoluble, so it didn’t. Yes, 
I think in the economic one in ’83, yes it was. ’85 with Lange: Lange was not 
really comfortable. He was never comfortable in any meeting and I don’t recall 
it being other than a fairly routine sort of gathering. He was more interested in 
making jokes about people around the table and over his shoulder with me 
sitting behind him and so on.  
 
SO: That suggested a degree of insecurity.  
 
GH: Yes. He was not comfortable in that setting. He was extremely intelligent, but 
with no great willpower, which is very odd in a Prime Minister. They tend to 
have willpower even more than intelligence quite often! 
 
SO: Do you think that was a reflection of his health issues? 
 
GH: No, I think that it was his personality. Well you’ll have to read my book which 
goes into that (Friendly Fire). I really learnt more about David writing that 
book than I did the five years when I was working with him.  But he wasn’t a 
Commonwealth figure. 
 
SO: No, because he was left out of the Nassau meeting when the small 
group got together, and decided on the EPG at the Retreat – and then 
put the idea to Thatcher.  
 




SO: And he was left ‘pressing his nose against the window.’ 
 
GH: A bit humiliated about that but it was his lack of clubbability. Commonwealth 
heads of government gatherings sort themselves out into who matters most 
like any other largely male gatherings. Like a good British school, you’re 
either in the first XI, or you’re not. 
 
SO: Being in ‘Pop’, with your waistcoat? 
 
GH: Yes, in ‘Pop’, if you’re at Eton. He was not in the first XI. Why I don’t know. He 
was not a joiner, his personality was awkward, he was insecure, and he had 
only been prime minister for a year when we went, although that should have 
been long enough. He had no ‘long experience’; he had never been in office 
when he became prime minister.  So he wasn’t, I think, a normal New 
Zealand prime minister of the sense that Muldoon, or Rowling, or Holyoake, 
or even Norman Kirk was. Anyhow, that was the last Commonwealth heads’ 
meeting that I went to. 
 
SO: So, could I just ask about the Prime Ministers you described before 
David Lange: how much was there an enduring and insidious attitude of 
New Zealand as being part of the ‘old’ Commonwealth? Of New Zealand 
being part of that first XI?  
 
GH: Yes, it’s a difficult question to answer, for all our problems over football, New 
Zealanders were not particularly racist. They took prime ministers at their face 
value, but you couldn’t avoid being part of the old Commonwealth: your 
educational background, you bonded with Britain and Canadians and so on 
more easily, helplessly, if you like, whether you wanted to or not. But I don’t 
think it was a conscious thing. There were people who would try to divide the 
Commonwealth into ‘old’ and ‘new’; and we certainly consciously - as we are 
now talking about New Zealand Foreign Service - consciously fought against 
that, and rightly. Rifts could open up very easily, on things like Rhodesia, 
where you were accused of being pro-Rhodesian because, ‘After all, they are 
your sort of people’ and that sort of thing. But on the whole, it wasn’t a big 
factor; but it was, I think, always in the background, if you know what I mean. 
You couldn’t avoid it.   
 
SO: An insidious colouring? 
 
GH: Yes, your colour, your voice, your education, your outlook on the world, your 
Western outlook and so on: these could not be denied. On the other hand, the 
whole point about the Commonwealth was that it was big enough to take in 
everybody. 
 




SO: Did you accompany your prime minister to any retreats or not? 
 
GH: Yes, I did to the one in Delhi, where the retreat was in Goa. You were 
supposed not to. They said, ‘No.’ The PM said, 'I think you had better come.’ 
and I said, ‘Well, I think they don’t want advisers.’ He said, ‘Never mind.’ He 
very kindly also asked Juliet, my wife to come, so we both went down to Goa 
and we had the most marvellous three days walking around Goa and eating 
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lovely food and so on. I didn't see my PM once because Mrs Gandhi kept 
everyone working 11 hour days. 
 
SO: To get her International Security Declaration?  
 
GH: Yes, exactly. When we got back to Delhi, the Prime Minister was very cross! 
He said to me, ‘I worked like fury. You’ve had nothing to do but walk around 
looking at cathedrals.’ I said, ‘Yes, and jolly nice it was too!’  But, I think that 
retreat wasn’t a success because on the whole, the growing practice of 
international declarations on this and that needs to be used with a very 
sparing hand. When you’ve really got something to declare, declare it, but 
otherwise don't. 
 
SO: Mrs Gandhi had a firm agenda for 1983: first, with the Non-Aligned 
Movement in March of that year. And the backdrop to the Delhi 
Commonwealth meeting was also, Pierre Trudeau’s decision to fly on to 
Moscow and try to kickstart the START negotiations again. 
 
GH: Yes.  
 
SO: This certainly chimed in with Mrs Gandhi’s own idea of the Indian Ocean 
being a nuclear free zone. So she had a different agenda, which was not 
necessarily particularly Commonwealth. 
 
GH: No. And the economic one, which as Chairman (of the CHOGM) was the one 
that she was pushing; this was in a sense, part of that. She thought that it was 
a way of once again getting more aid to the developing countries. Which was 
certainly a by-product, but not the purpose of it.  But for the same reason she 
was pushing that. But at that meeting, I heard Bob Hawke say, ‘This is the 
best Commonwealth discussion I’ve ever been present at.’ And I think he was 
right. She complained about the American action in Grenada. That triggered 
off an impromptu morning's discussion as could only happen in the 
Commonwealth. There was no agenda item or anything, but suddenly for the 
rest of the morning, we had as Bob Hawke said, one of the best debates on 
the security of small island states you could possibly hope to hear. And it was 
led by a very formidable lady who was Premier of Dominica.  
 
SO: Eugenia Charles? 
 
GH: Yes. She took objection to Mrs Gandhi's remarks about Grenada and said, 
‘That is not true. We were all vulnerable.’ I remember her saying, ‘A launch 
load of armed men would take over my Government'. She stressed the 
vulnerability of states like hers in the Caribbean, saying ‘Thank God that that 
mad man in Grenada was removed, but we’ve still got a security problem in 
the Caribbean that all of us are still having to think about.’ 
 
SO: Because they only had small police forces, trained for civilian policing? 
 
GH: Exactly. Well, Mrs Charles' point that a launch load of armed men could 
overthrow Caribbean island state governments led, as you know, to a lot of 
Commonwealth work done on the security of small states. That debate came 
out of the blue really, because Mrs Gandhi was a bit provocative about the 




SO: Robert Mugabe was particularly critical of the American intervention in 
Grenada. 
 
GH: Yes, I’d forgotten about that, but you’re right. But it was interesting that Bob 
Hawke said that. I do remember him saying it and he was right. That didn’t 
happen all that often in the Commonwealth, but you could never have had 
that in New York. It was impromptu, unscheduled, genuine, and frank, and 
something happened. We set up something to look at safeguarding our small 
states. That’s one of the best arguments I’ve ever seen at a Commonwealth 
meeting. 
 
SO: Were you allowed to sit in on those executive closed sessions? 
 
GH: Yes, I was there. Yes.  
 
SO: And would you agree that the energy, the engagement between heads, 
the unscripted contributions… 
 
GH: Oh yes, I was the only person with my prime minister basically trying to take a 
note or two. But everyone was struck by the force, energy and the frankness. 
Not rude, nobody was rude; there was no abuse or anything, but people did 
not tailor their ‘diplomatic speak’, and Eugenia Charles led the way. All the 
Eastern Caribbean was lined up behind her but she was a very forceful 
personality; and she carried the day. 
 
SO: There was a split between the Caribbean islands, wasn’t there?  
 
GH: Yes, I can’t remember the details. 
 
SO: The Organisation of East Caribbean States took very much the robust 
line: Tom Adams, John Compton and Eugenia Charles.  
 
GH: Yes, they said they were the most at risk. 
 
SO: There were those who were more radical. 
 
GH: Yes, there was also something of an anti-American group. That is right. I don’t 
remember the full details but I do remember what an unusual thing it was for 
that sort of thing to happen. 
 
SO: You stepped down from being Head of the Prime Minister’s office in 
1987? 
 
GH: I was there from 1980 to ’87. 
 
SO: So did you go to the 1987 Heads meeting? 
 
GH: No I didn’t. I became Coordinator of Domestic and External Security.  
 
SO: For New Zealand of course the big fight once David Lange became 
Prime Minister, was the whole question of American warships, which 
potentially carrying nuclear weapons, and the policy of ‘neither confirm 
nor deny.’ 
 




SO: How much of that was a product of, and reflective of opinion within New 
Zealand domestic politics? Or was it a particular agenda within the 
upper echelons of New Zealand Labour Party, and David Lange’s own 
personal policy? 
 
GH: It was both. New Zealanders had had a long history of worrying about nuclear 
testing in the South Pacific and by the French. Well, it was originally the 
Americans and the British, but latterly the French atmospheric testing, which 
you know brought strong reactions to those who lived in the South Pacific and 
found their milk contaminated with Strontium-90. It created I think a 
considerable nuclear sensitivity in New Zealand.  But no one was particularly 
opposed to American visits. But the left wing of the New Zealand Labour 
Party was in fact very keen on the anti-nuclear policy. I think it would be fair to 
say that they were strongly opposed to the American alliance, hoped to end 
New Zealand's participation and saw the nuclear issue as the best line of 
attack. 
 
The problem was that the Labour Government in ’84 was elected on a 
platform of no nuclear weapons within New Zealand’s territorial waters; but 
also full membership of ANZUS. And the problem that faced the Prime 
Minister and his advisers was how to reconcile these two very different aims 
and we laboured away to square that circle, in the end without success. Our 
plan had been, with the Prime Minister’s full encouragement, to get a visit by 
an American warship which was, if you like, patently non-nuclear. And having 
had that visit we could let the question of naval visits lie for two or three years, 
while everybody took fresh stock of the situation and we might get a better 
solution later on. That idea didn’t work because the prime minister didn’t tell 
his colleagues anything about what he was doing arranging this visit. When 
the story broke he was out of the country and left it to his deputy who had 
known nothing about it to manage the controversy. 
 
SO: So, that’s when he was in Tokelau. 
 
GH: He went to Tokelau out of effective wireless communication, and it all broke 
nationally while he was away. And we lost that battle. Now it’s all in Friendly 
Fire, in great detail. 
 
SO: Yes. That was the USS Buchanan?  
 
GH: Yes.  The USS Buchanan yes. And it broke in January 1985. 
 
SO: How far were you also having to firefight in New Zealand’s relationship 
with Canberra in this? 
 
GH: On the nuclear issue? 
 
SO: Yes.  
 
GH: Oh, very much. It was a three-way alliance and the Australians were 
genuinely very angry with us because they felt we were endangering the 
whole alliance. It was pretty clear that arranging that kind of defensive 
alliance with the Americans, where it was agreed to defend each other if 
threatened, was unlikely to be possible in the present day. It was a creature of 
the early 1950s and the Australians who placed great reliance on it felt we 
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were rather wilfully jeopardising it. What also increased their anger with us 
was that the dispute risked reopening a split their own Australian Labour 
Party, which was in power. Bob Hawke was prime minister, but the left wing 
faction in the ALP also wished to ban possible nuclear naval visits.  Hawke 
had faced them down; Hawke and Bill Hayden, his foreign minister had won 
that battle; and they had reviewed ANZUS and said it should go on as it is. 
They felt that we were being soft in not taking the same line. And that by our 
actions, we were raising the risk of re-opening that old wound in the ALP, so 
naturally they felt cross about it. 
 
So the relationship was strained and Hawke and Lange did not get on. I think 
not just because of this, but temperamentally they were very different. It’s still 
clear to this day when you talk to Hawke, but even at the time when we had 
the South Pacific Forum meeting we adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone, somebody asked Bob from the press, ‘How did you get on with Mr 
Lange?’ And Hawke said  - from memory, I’ve quoted it in the book – ‘I found 
him fairly congenial. We were at opposite ends of the table.’ Now you couldn’t 
get a more cool-ish answer than that! And it was true, the two did not get on. 
 
SO: How much of this was also reflective of pressure within Australia, and 
within New Zealand of a grass roots campaign for nuclear 
disarmament? 
 
GH: Oh, very much so. In New Zealand there obviously was a big lobbying effort. 
The polling in New Zealand exasperatingly, if you were trying to solve the 
difficulty, always came out about 75% of those polled wished to ban nuclear 
weapons in New Zealand, and 75% exactly the same number, wished to 
remain full members of ANZUS, thus leaving us with the same problem. Right 
until the end when pressed, a small majority of the polls would have accepted 
American visits if that was the price of ANZUS, so there never was a sort of 
tidal wave of opposition. But the government was very nervous about the 
political costs of having to leave ANZUS; so we played out our hand as long 
as we could. When we finally did, Shultz said, ‘We part as friends, but we part 
company.’ David Lange was really quite angry and quite worried. But New 
Zealand faced no threat and after a year or two those who worried about 
membership of ANZUS stopped worrying. There wasn’t an immediate threat; 
that’s not to say there couldn’t be one in the future, but there wasn’t then. And 
so the issue died away as a politically sensitive issue. 
 
SO: Sir, how much were you aware of this being a global movement, and 
cross-fertilisation of ideas? I’m particularly conscious of the peace 




SO: And in the early ‘80s, the CND movement in Britain. 
 
GH: Oh, very much. 
 
SO: Against Pershing and Cruise missiles being installed at Greenham 








GH: Oh, no doubt. Like a seismic wave, the movement travelled across the world 
and landed up in New Zealand where it had a big impact. It energised lobbies, 
the people who think politics deals only with single issues. People were 
brought from Britain to talk about the nuclear menace and what they saw as 
the growing risk of nuclear annihilation and certainly the whole lobbying effort 
was greatly energised.  In subsequent histories of the KGB, there’s talk about 
what the KGB spent in Europe.  
 
SO: I was about to say, where did the money for doing this come from? 
 
GH: Yes. I was Chairman of the Intelligence Council for 10 years. I was interested 
in this. And I asked Oleg Gordievsky, the double agent, because he had been 
head of the Australia and New Zealand division of the KGB. I said, ‘How 
much did the KGB spend in New Zealand on that campaign?’  And he said to 
me, ‘I don’t know. Gerald, you must remember’ - very memorable words – ‘we 
in the KGB [he was still saying ‘we in the KGB’], know the Left and we know 
the buttons to push.’ And I thought that was a very shrewd point. I’m sure 
some money was spent here, but I think the main impetus came more from 
the great European wave of opposition to nuclear weapons. Whatever the 
KGB may have spent in Europe, I wouldn’t attach a huge weight to the cause 
being money-driven in New Zealand. These were people who were genuinely 
worried about American imperialism, as they saw it, and certainly worried 
about nuclear weapons, as everybody was. I don’t know what the KGB may 
have spent but it was unnecessary to postulate some huge spending by them 
and I thought Gordievsky’s comment, ‘We know the Left and we know buttons 
to push’ was right.  
 
The Soviet Union persistently weighed in over the ANZUS dispute, much to 
David Lange’s embarrassment. At least once he called in the Soviet 
Ambassador and gave him a dressing down and told him to pipe down. But of 
course the Soviet Union was fairly pleased with the way the dispute 
developed. They had gambled heavily in Europe and in fact lost on the 
deployment of the Pershing and Cruise missiles after they had deployed the 
SS-20s. And they were making a big effort on Japan then; they really were 
spending money in Japan. But, if New Zealand, which mattered much less, 
could be detached from the Western alliance, well maybe Australia would 
follow and there would be a consequent impact on Japanese opinion. So they 
did have some interest and hope in us, but certainly they played no part with 
the New Zealand Government which was very wary of them. 
 
SO: Two things, Sir: how much do you feel that the Americans valued the 
‘old Commonwealth’ - and New Zealand is part of the old 
Commonwealth - precisely because of the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence 
sharing arrangement? Was America’s attitude of the Commonwealth, 
this multilateral diverse association, shaped by the fact of a core group 
of countries who were ‘old’ Commonwealth who helped underpin 
America’s global strategic interest, precisely because of intelligence 
sharing? 
 
GH: Yes, I think they saw us not as Commonwealth members but as the legacy of 
World War II. We’d been one of a handful of active allies and as you say, the 
intelligence arrangements had even survived the ANZUS bust up, the Five 
Power arrangements. They saw us as close friends and oddly enough, even 
after the split, it was impossible to totally eradicate this attitude on either side. 
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They believed we were still close friends because, I think, again language, 
common institutions, common interests made the actual alliance a formality 
and everyone, even including David Lange, assumed that despite the quarrel 
the Americans would still come to our aid if we got into trouble. 
 
At the time of the ANZUS quarrel when I went around friends in South East 
Asia. I got the feeling, although they didn’t put it this bluntly, that they didn’t 
take it terribly seriously; they thought it was the sort of row that breaks out in 
families and blows over. And it’s more the sort of row ‘New Zealand, the 
nephew of a very rich Uncle Sam, has said, ‘We’re going to be independent 
and live on our own.’ And Uncle says ‘Oh, off you go, lad.’ But later when the 
nephew gets into trouble the uncle is immediately down to the police station 
with the bail. The feeling that if we got into trouble the Americans would have 
to help anyhow. This was David Lange’s view - and probably true. New 
Zealanders did feel that the relationship would endure despite the dispute 
over ship visits, and were confirmed in this view when the Americans took no 
steps over New Zealand's trade which actually went up during the quarrel. 
They felt that the real bonds were probably not breakable. 
 
SO: Did Gordievsky and KGB feel it was real? 
 
GH: I think they hoped it was breakable. I can’t speak for the KGB.  
 
SO: I just wondered if he passed comment on how much credibility ‘we’ 
attached to the New Zealand disagreements with Australia and the US 
over nuclear armed vessels? 
 
GH: He was out of the KGB by then even though he said “we in the KGB”. I don’t 
know. I think they saw, as I say, a hope that perhaps some unravelling of 
Western solidarity might start. But by that stage, in ’85, they were living on 
hopes. 
 
SO: I was going to say, by then Gorbachev was elected First Secretary of the 
CPSU, in March  ’85. 
 
GH: Yes.  
 
SO: And then began his progressive recalibration of what constituted 
security for the Soviet Union.  
 
GH: They had by then lost the battle over European security. They had from ’81 to 
’83 really made a big effort to face down the deployment of the Cruise and 
Pershing missiles in Europe. Christopher Andrew says they spent $100 
million in Europe to support popular opposition to the deployments, and I 
believe he has good sources. The Mitrokhin archive volumes which have 
been published so far, lend some credibility to that figure. Anyhow that’s by 
the way. When they lost that, and they had by ‘83/’84, I think New Zealand 
was a sort of minor consolation prize, or the prospect of a minor consolation 
prize, I think their real hope was Japan. 
 
SO: On this question of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: was Fiji a 






SO: It is one of the larger Pacific nations. 
 
GH: No, it was an Australian idea. An Australian proposal, although naturally New 
Zealand was quite keen on it too. It rolled along at a fairly leisurely pace 
through at least two Pacific Forums, I think three.  In other words, I don’t think 
there was any sort of fiery pressure for it. The main pressure from Pacific 
countries was from Walter Lini, of Vanuatu. My impression now from memory 
- and we’d have to check this with the minutes - was that Fiji, certainly 
Samoa, and Tonga, were rather cautious.  By that I mean, not against 
anything, in favour of it, but not pressing for a reaction. And at one stage I 
think at David Lange’s first Forum in 1984 in Tuvalu he talked about taking it 
to the UN, to Bob Hawke’s irritation, and there wasn’t any great support for 
that. You’ve got to remember it was also running and competing in the Pacific 
Forum for attention with the situation in New Caledonia, which was then a 
very lively issue; so it wasn’t the sole topic. But I didn’t ever get the 
impression that it was a matter of hot or fiery debate in the South Pacific, 
except for Walter Lini. 
 




SO: I know that Malcolm Fraser was largely instrumental in setting up the 
Commonwealth Regional Heads of Government meeting in Sydney, 
followed by biennial meetings in Suva, Fiji; and Port Moresby, Papua 
New Guinea. 
 
GH: Yes, that’s right. I was at the last two. In Suva in '82 and then in Papua New 
Guinea in ‘84.  
 
SO: How much value do you think those meetings had? 
 
GH: Well, I think the general feeling was not enough to keep them going. It 
seemed an interesting idea, there were a lot of regional things to talk about, 
but I noticed that by Suva, there was a growing inertia and certainly by Papua 
New Guinea which was the last of the meetings. So I think they died because 
there just wasn’t felt to be a need. 
 
SO: It wasn’t that Malcolm Fraser was no longer Australian Prime Minister, 
and it had been his particular initiative? 
 
GH: No. I don’t think it was that. Mahathir, I remember talking to him in Suva about 
it. It was new then. I got the feeling, but this is long after the event, that they 
didn’t get the exposure to global Commonwealth Prime Ministers that they 
really liked. A regional meeting cannot deal with the big issues that concern 
leaders and you know a lot of the people already; it just wasn’t in the same 
category of ‘Must do’s’ as the global one.  
 
SO: And yet when I spoke to Malcolm Frazer a week ago he said, ‘I 
deliberately had this idea because I felt that Heads of small states didn’t 
speak up at these bigger meetings.’ 
 
GH: Well, he’s right but the fact is the idea died. Nobody stamped on it or criticised 
it, it just faded. And that was a good Commonwealth way of dealing with the 
37 
 
problem. I just felt that people felt there wasn’t enough to get them to leave 
their busy offices to… 
 
SO: Yes.  Exactly so if there was the input, and sense of value attached by 
Heads, it was going to wither on the vine.  
 
GH: Then the thing dies.  Exactly. 
 
SO: Obviously something that didn’t wither on the vine was the whole 








SO: You had pretty much a ring side view on that particular crisis. 
 
GH: I was closer to the ring than I had intended! The Prime Minister sent me to 
Suva. The Auckland Labour Party was really quite close to the Fiji Labour 
Party and giving them help and advice. But we were much more distant from 
the Fijian ‘chiefly’ end. As far as I know David Lange was the first to 
announce to the world that there was a coup going on because we got a flash 
message on our intelligence that armed men had moved into Parliament; and 
I told the PM and he made an announcement straight away. And I and the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs both said to him very earnestly, ‘Now obviously 
you’ve got to denounce this assault on Parliamentary democracy. But you’ve 
got to be careful what you say because Fiji has a very sensitive and 
complicated chiefly system, and we have to tread carefully.’ We went over 
this with the PM before his press conference; and as always David Lange 
said yes, yes, I understand that. Then at his press conference, he criticised 
Ratu Mara, calling him a traitor. 
 
SO: Oh!  
 
GH: And I heard that and I thought, ‘Well, there goes our chance of being a useful 
intermediary.’ Ratu Mara was, as you may remember, a very proud and 
sensitive man. He had nothing to do with the coup and I don’t know what led 
David Lange to say that, but he did have a tendency to get carried away in 
press conferences.  Anyhow, I realised then that we’d put our foot in it quite 
badly. Five days later I had just arrived in my office at 8 in the morning and 
got a phone call to say that an Air New Zealand 747 from Tokyo had been 
hijacked while refuelling in Nadi. I won’t give you the whole story, but 
managing events from Wellington was difficult. And finally the PM said, ‘You’d 
better go up there.’ 
 
SO: Excuse me, who had taken it?  
 
GH: Well, that’s always the problem with a hijack. You don’t know at the beginning 
and you begin your efforts in a maze of uncertainty. After an hour or so we 
established that it was a lone hijacker, a Fiji Indian in the cockpit who 
demanded to be flown to Libya and presented a series of rather incoherent 
notes to President Reagan, the Queen and David Lange. He had been 
supervising the re-fuelling of the plane; and when this had been completed 
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and the passengers were starting to reboard, he appeared on the flight deck 
with 6 sticks of dynamite around his waist and a cigarette lighter and said the 
obvious. A very quick-witted flight steward grasped in some way what was 
going and got the passengers off; so in the end he had hijacked the plane 
with the flight crew on the flight deck but nobody else. The plane was of 
course fully re-fuelled and he demanded it fly to Libya. 
 
SO: Can you say whom you first thought had taken it?  
 
GH: We didn’t have a view. You simply don’t know. Believe me it’s an awful hour 
while you’re trying to work out how big the group is, what their intentions are 
and so on.  
 
SO: Yes.  
 
GH: And it was sometime before we basically became assured that it was one 
person.  He had a gloomy brother and somebody else in the airport but they 
were only hanging around. There was no big group. And he wanted to fly to 
Libya.  I could communicate with the pilot reasonably quietly through a single 
side band radio in the cockpit; and it turned out a very sensible Fiji Indian 
Inspector of Police in the control tower could communicate also with the pilot 
but through the loud speaker in the roof of the cockpit so it could be heard by 
the hijacker. 
 
So it was very ticklish, but I had to keep saying to the pilot, ‘You’re there and 
I’m not. So you’ve got to be the final decider but can we keep talking because 
once you take off with a full load of fuel, we’ve completely lost control of the 
situation. Let’s try and stay on the ground as long as we can.’  He 
understandably got a bit itchy with this constant advice because I had to keep 
saying, ‘I know. It’s you, not me, but let’s keep talking as long as we can. ’ So 
we talked and talked; and when it became apparent that there was only one 
hijacker, we thought, ‘We’re okay if we can keep talking. Sooner or later, if 
nothing else, sleep will overcome and we’ll be okay.’ Well, in fact something 
better than that happened. A tough little nut who was the flight engineer on 
the excuse of going to the lavatory, went down the aircraft and came back 
with 40 oz bottle of Teacher’s Whisky and hit him over the head with it and 
knocked him out. That was the end of that. 
 
Before that, I had made a mistake which was nearly fatal. The Inspector came 
on the line and said to me ‘I’ve got his mother and father with me here in the 
control tower. Shall I put them on the speaker to the plane? I thought, ‘Yes, 
that’s a good idea. Let them do this. Mum and dad. Just the thing.’ It was just 
not the thing. His mother wept and said, ‘Son, you have brought eternal 
shame on us which nothing now can wipe out’; and finally the pilot’s voice 
came on the side band radio to say, ‘For Christ sake, get her off! He’s getting 
jittery and he’s lit his lighter and he’s waving it around near the dynamite.’ So 
we pulled mum and dad away from the mike quickly. I’d never do that again. 
But I thought at the time, you learn these things, I’m sad to say. 
 
SO: Did you have any assistance in your hostage negotiations from others 
who had been through it?  
 
GH: No, I didn’t. And I’m still cross about that. We had rehearsed all this. I was 
Chairman of the Terrorism Committee, and we had borrowed from the British 
the concept of a combined Committee of Ministers and Officials, tailored to 
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the particular issue - foreign affairs, if it was foreign and so on. And we had 
run a full-dress exercise for a hijack, when only the Prime Minister and I knew 
it was fake. We summoned everybody in on the lunch hour, saying a plane 
had been hijacked at Wellington Airport and so on. We went through the 
whole drill; so we’d really foreseen and practiced all that. So when I got the 
original message about the Fiji hijack, I went to the PM’s room. It was about 
quarter past 8 and I said, ‘This has happened. We don’t know any more, but 
we’ve got the set-up in the basement of the Beehive with all the 
communications and so on as we had exercised. So could you move down 
there?’ And, to my horror, David said, ‘No. I don’t see any need to convene 
the Terrorist Committee’ and I said, ‘But I can’t coordinate without that.’ And 
he said, ‘You’ll manage.’ The phones were already shrilling outside his room 
and I found myself dashing between the phones. The Minister of Police, a 
very intelligent lady, was passing by and said ‘Do you need a hand?’ I just 
pointed to a phone that was ringing, while I was talking on another one; and 
she picked it up and found herself speaking to her own Commissioner of 
Police who was trying to find out what was going on. I couldn’t keep my 
colleagues properly informed, though I did manage to keep the police 
informed. The Chief of Defence Staff came over finally to find me. There was 
simply no time to tell my colleagues what was happening, most of the time I 
was on the phone to Nadi Airport talking with the pilot and the inspector in the 
dealing with that. 
 
But then after two hours I felt we’d got a grip on it. The chap had twice backed 
off his demands to take off, most recently to go to Auckland and I thought, 
‘We are gradually getting the upper hand.’ So I stepped into the PM’s room 
and told him that the position was getting clearer now. He said, ‘I think you 
should go up there.’ I said, ‘There’s no point in my going. There’s a very 
competent Fijian Inspector there. The pilot is coping. We’ve got 
communications through Air New Zealand with them. My job is here, not 
there.' And so he said a second time. When he said it a third time, I realised 
that it was insubordinate to continue to refuse. So I said, ‘Very well.’ They laid 
on a plane and took me up to Nadi. I arrived just as the poor old hijacker was 
being wheeled out of the plane with a large bump on the back of his head.  
 
Then I rang the PM and reported to him what had happened. He said, ‘I’d like 
you to go to the High Commission in Suva. They are under some pressure 
there.’ So I drove across the island to Suva where full-scale riots were under 
way and the Fijian Prime Minister, Dr Bavadra, and his wife had taken refuge 
in the High Commissioner's residence when I arrived there for lunch. As the 
rioters approached we had to make hasty evacuation plans. We had 
fortunately a frigate in the harbour and in those days, until they bought new 
ones when I was Secretary of Defence, the frigates had a very tiny helicopter 
- what they call a ‘Wasp’ - which would only take 2 passengers as well as the 
pilot.  So our plan was to get Dr Bavadra and his wife away in the Wasp from 
the tennis court; and the rest of us just had to scramble down the hillside, 
ahead of the mob which had been coming along towards us. I remember the 
Private Secretary being outraged that he was going to be left behind. I said, 
‘Look, it’s too bad. You can join me scrambling down the hillside if the worst 
comes to the worst.' But the rioters turned back and the problem didn’t arise. 
I’m sorry about talking about this because it’s not really relevant to your… 
 
SO: No, but I’m just laughing because I know where the New Zealand 





GH: It’s straight down. Yes, I’m glad you realise what it was like! I think we would 
have got down the hill fairly quickly. 
 
SO: Oh yes! But I was talking about the Fiji coup. 
 
GH: Well, this was in the aftermath of the coup when there was bad racial rioting. I 
had actually seen it before in Fiji, in Christmas 1959, and I’ve never forgotten 
it. There was something peculiarly sickening about people chasing an old lady 
and hitting her down the road and so on, because she’s a different colour. No 
riot where people are savaged is a pleasant sight, but somehow in a racial 
riot, the violence is gratuitous. It’s mindless and gratuitous and certainly that 
night in Suva there was some bad incidents.  We got the Prime Minister 
safely away to his home in the west and my last task was to get the head of 
his department, who had taken refuge with his family in the High Commission 
offices, safely out of the country.  
 
SO: Are you aware of a discussion about whether India was shipping arms 
to Fiji? 
 
GH: There were rumours galore.  No evidence whatsoever. I think there was a 
degree of racial hysteria in parts of Fiji, or in Suva at any rate. I can’t speak 
for anywhere else, which gave rise to that sort of rumour. There was no 
evidence of it at all. Some members of the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group which was 
largely Indian Fijian, four of them were killed or badly injured when their own 
bomb went off. Naturally there were fears of more of these; in fact, it was the 
only one. And there was no other violence of that sort but there was rioting. I 
don’t have to tell the whole story; my memoir 'Final Approaches' tells the 
slightly farcical story of getting Dr Sutherland and his wife out of the High 
Commission and safely on the plane to Sydney. They were being sought by 
the army and might have had a bad time if we hadn’t got them out.  
 




SO: Obviously Fiji was suspended from the Commonwealth at that meeting. 
 
GH: Yes, yes.  
 
SO: Because the second coup that year had happened.  
 
GH: No, I can’t really add anything to that I was doing other things then.  
 
SO: During your involvement with foreign policy and defence policy, what 
was your general view of the importance or not, of the Commonwealth 
to New Zealand politicians and foreign policy makers? 
 
GH: It varies. It was certainly more important earlier in my career than it was 
towards the end. But I think it would be true to say, ‘Pretty important, at either 
end, for New Zealand.’ Isolated, small, English speaking, the Commonwealth 
had links and horizons which otherwise would not have been available. We 
always placed great importance on the United Nations obviously. But where 
we originally played a much bigger part in the UN - after all, we were only one 
of the five or six victors at the end of the War who had been in it from the 
41 
 
beginning, and thus had influence - but as the membership of the UN got 
wider and wider that influence became progressively diluted.  In the end, 
although still very important to us, the UN lacked that intimacy and immediacy 
and I think the Commonwealth has always supplied something what was 
missing from that.  It’s hard to quantify it because it was more instinctive than 
conscious. But the feeling that it provided wider horizons, more opportunities 
of listening to people and, as I said earlier, more opportunities of getting to 
know people of perhaps very different views: ‘Why were they holding these 
views?’ and so on. I think the Commonwealth has always been important to 
New Zealand politicians and New Zealanders generally. I think you can go on 
the attendance. A New Zealand Prime Minister is very loathe to miss a 
Commonwealth meeting. 
 




SO: Because that’s the trouble with very words ‘the Commonwealth.’ The 
phrase is used as an ideal. 
 
GH: Yes.  
 
SO: Yet the Commonwealth as an inter-governmental organisation from the 
‘90s changed again, with the increasing role of civil society and NGO 
activism. Do you feel this diluted further the influence of the Heads’ 
meeting, the intergovernmental pillar? 
  
GH: Yes.  
 
SO:  And of course New Zealand became a member of the UN Security 
Council.  
 
GH: Well, it’s been on and off at various times. It has hopes again, but that’s a 
relatively minor thing. I wouldn’t want to exaggerate the Commonwealth, but I 
think there’s still that instinctive feeling that there is a kind of bond, not a bond 
that we have with countries that are not members.   
 
SO: How far would you say that it provides a particular platform to augment 
New Zealand standing in the international community, as a vehicle for 
particular Prime Ministers?  I know that Malcolm Fraser expressly used 
it as a way to enhance Australia’s standing in the international 
community.  
 
GH: Yes, I think it depends on the Prime Minister. It’s a matter of their personality. 
 
SO: Well, obviously David Lange didn’t! 
 
GH: No, David Lange didn’t. Muldoon in both senses: both villain of the 
Commonwealth over South Africa and as on the new Bretton Woods 
campaign, the admired leader of new economic thinking. Norman Kirk did 
although he was Prime Minister for too short a time; he was at Ottawa and I 
think definitely made an impression. 
 




GH: Well I wasn’t there. 
 
SO: I just wondered. 
 
GH: But I think that from New Zealand’s point of view, it did depend on the 
personality and the authority of the Prime Minister, rather than just being 
Prime Minister. 
 
SO: How important, as you observed, was the Queen? How much did she 
contribute to the ongoing vitality of the Commonwealth?  
 
GH: I suppose it’s a generation thing and you’re talking to somebody from another 
generation. I’d have thought the Queen really was quite important, as the kind 
of ‘dignified glue', if you can have such a thing! She lent her presence there, 
her ‘bilaterals’ - her individual meetings with each of the prime ministers, or 
most of the Prime Ministers, and the parties on Britannia. I think it’s very hard 
to put a weight on them but they seem to me to add to the dignity of the 
Commonwealth; and in political affairs, I think the dignity of an arrangement is 
almost as important as the effectiveness of it. Obviously after her? The 
question is up for grabs. My instinct, and this may reflect on the generation 
rather than anything more informed, is that we will probably continue with the 
head of the Commonwealth as Prince Charles, but I know we could have a 
rotating one. But the problem with a rotating one is the problem you have with 
the President of the Republic. There may be very good reasons for having a 
President of the Republic, but it is damned hard to have a President who has 




GH: For that reason I think that we would probably continue with a Royal 
arrangement after Her Majesty. But as I say, I have to add a caution, you’re 
talking to somebody who grew up when she had just become Queen and so 
my generational view may be very different from that of others of another 
generation. 
 
SO: The media buzz and general aura that surrounds the Queen, particularly 
after the 2012 London Olympics and the Jubilee last year, is striking. 
When I talk to my daughter who’s 26, I’m impressed she is an immense 
admirer of the Queen. Of the Queen herself, not simply the younger 




SO: There are certainly those who feel that the Queen is definitely one of the 
Commonwealth’s ‘secret weapon’ - in her good humour, in her 
incomparable knowledge, in her charisma, her star quality, but also her 
evident political commitment to this unique association. 
 
GH: That’s been very important. Now whether that survives a change? It’s quite 
clear and it’s been clear all along, the Queen has set great store by the 
Commonwealth. She’s been teased about it and I’ve heard British Ministers 
being slightly irritable about her views and her insistence on doing the right 
thing, but I think that commitment has been part of the success of the thing; 






GH: But she has made it very clear that personally she is very interested in the 
Commonwealth and that I think has made a big difference. It means that all 
sorts of Commonwealth leaders, of new Commonwealth leaders and in some 
cases just out of jail, whatever felt welcome and comfortable in her presence 
which, you know, is really something. I do remember at one meeting - I think it 
was in Lagos in ’66  - there was some almost - boasting around the table as 
to who had been imprisoned by the British. It was very cheerful but ended in 
laughter when Lester Pearson said “I too have been imprisoned by the 
British”. There was considerable surprise around the table and Pearson said, 
‘Yes, in the First World War I was Sergeant Pearson. Late back from leave I 
was held overnight in a British guardhouse.' It all dissolved in laughter. Some 
of those present had been more seriously jailed but Pearson’s tact in telling 
his own story made it a joke. And that too, I could never imagine that in New 
York, that sort of discussion. It was the kind of thing that, I hope it still 
happens, but it certainly was part of the charm of the organisation and why it 
diffused to a large extent what otherwise what might have been a lot of post-
colonial resentments. 
 
SO: So with your long experience and observation of the Commonwealth, to 
what do you attribute its survival, in addition to the Queen. You 
mentioned ‘inertia’; you mentioned individual value that particular prime 
ministers have attached to it. What does this say then for the key 
aspects if the Commonwealth is to survive and regenerate itself going 
forward?  
 
GH: It’s a hard question, obviously. I think it has declined in influence and visibility 
and you might say, ‘Well, that’s inevitable, that we are now 50/60 years on 
from its primary role as helping everybody over the stile of post-colonialism, 
which it did superbly.’ But I think it’s not just inertia which can never be ruled 
out in an international organisation. There is still a Great Exhibition committee 
that meets somewhere in London as a legacy from the Great Exhibition of 
1851. We used to speculate whether that phantom of 1956, the Suez Canal 
Users Association, still meets quietly somewhere once a year. International 
organisations are extremely hard to abolish. But however, that’s not the 
reason for the Commonwealth’s survival. It’s not the reason why the Prime 
Ministers and Heads of Government go; there is much more than that to it. I 
think it’s ease of procedure. I don’t think prime ministers go because of the 
excellent work and sterling technical coordination and so on. I mean, they 
supportive of all that of course, but that’s not what’s going to get them out of 
their chairs to go to Heads of Government meetings. I think they do go 
because it has an informality, a punchiness unlike the formality and often 
dullness of General Assembly debates. It provides a gathering where Heads 
of Government can still, as I said earlier, take each other’s measure and meet 
and form some views of who is more impressive or more convincing, whether 
this or that person is reliable; and I think all politicians want to do that. And it 
means that if there’s ever a need they can talk to the prime minister of such 
and such a country because they have met them a couple of times before, 
and ring them up and talk on an easy way. So from the Heads of Government 
point of view, I think that’s all very important and it’s why they go. And while 
they continue to go then I think the rest flows down, the technical cooperation, 
the good work that the Commonwealth does, work it’s done on good 
governance and so on, it gets its authority from the fact that Heads of 




SO: I’ve got two questions coming out of your description of the sources of 
the value of the Commonwealth: 
1) how much is the viability and vitality of the Commonwealth attached 
critically to the persona and activities of the Secretary General, and you 
have known two closely?  
2) During your time as a New Zealand diplomat and civil servant, your 
intimate involvement in foreign affairs, the Commonwealth had two 
grand strategies: opposition to apartheid, and development. On the first 
there was a publically identified grand strategy against apartheid. It had 
a good news story, as it did promoting development. Now does the 
Commonwealth indeed really have a grand strategy?   
 
GH: Yes, both are important. Let me just take the second one, I think it does have 
one now. I think the work it’s done on good governance. I know it’s an uphill 
job. You cannot change people’s social and political culture overnight. And 
there are habits and so on which are inimical to good governance, corruption 
and bribery and all the rest of it, but the Commonwealth has nagged away 
and has set out principles. I think it’s the only international body that really 
does that or has that sort of influence. And it’s easy to point to where it fails 
and lacks credibility, but I think it’s had an effect and if it keeps plugging on 
that strategy post-apartheid if you like, it is a job for which its qualifications are 
rather better than anyone else's. It’s not a UN thing again. The UN’s too wide, 
too subject to veto and so on, so I think the theme of good governance is an 
important one for the Commonwealth to keep pushing and it has I think for the 
last 10 years or so. On your first point, I think, leadership is critical and I think, 
well you know my experience was two very able leaders, Arnold and Sonny. 





GH: And I think that it badly needs that sort of vigorous but experienced leadership 
to give it direction and to compel the attention of Heads of Government. They 
will listen to somebody like Arnold who bounces in and you know grabs them 
by the lapels and talks, they won’t listen to memos sent to them urging good 
works and so on. So there has to be that personal element and I think it has 




GH: Whether we have that or not now I certainly don’t know but I do think that the 
organisation’s vitality does depend on leadership, and I don’t mean leadership 
by a chairman of Prime Minister’s meetings, I mean what happens in 
between. Which is really the Secretary. I remember being in London a few 
years ago when there was a large Aid for Africa demonstration. And I was 
rather shocked that nobody thought, Tony Blair didn’t think, to invite the 
Commonwealth Secretary-General to sit on the stage with everyone else who 
was concerned, and I thought dear me that is not a good sign, I mean some 
years earlier it would have been taken for granted, the Secretary-General 






GH: So in that sense it may have faded back a little but I’m not speaking from a 
close personal knowledge. 
 









SO: ’65 to ’90. 
 
GH: Well in my era ’65 to ’85 really but I think that leadership is not something that 
you can easily produce whenever it is needed. 
 
SO: Would you say then that says a politician rather than a diplomat. I know 
Arnold Smith obviously was a very, very senior diplomat?  
 
GH: I think it depends on the person. I think the trend has been towards a 
politician. There’s no doubt that there is a camaraderie among politicians. 
They understand one another, even when their political views may be strongly 
opposed, because they are after all in the same profession. They understand 
better than anyone else how the business works and so underneath the 
struggles and fiery disputes they may have more in common with their 
political opposition than they have with anyone else. So I think it may be, and 
I’m really speaking very speculatively on this, that the trend now has to be 
another politician, but I wouldn’t put that down as a rule. I think it depends on 
the personality, the creativity and the vigour of the person. If you had another 
Arnold I wouldn’t for a moment say we must have a politician, but if you had a 
politician who had that sort of courage and push then I think that would be 
ideal. 
 
SO: So, do you think that the Secretary-General and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat is indeed the beating heart of the Commonwealth? 
 
GH: Yes and no, is the difficult answer to that. I mean no, in the sense that if it 
died the Commonwealth would still have lots of links so it doesn’t depend on 
that. But yes, in the sense that the way the Commonwealth functions, and 
even just the organising of meetings of foreign ministers and so on, without it 
there would be nobody to do it. Going back to a Commonwealth Office is 
unthinkable now, so if there’s no Secretariat there who would do it? And if that 
was so, Commonwealth gatherings and indeed initiatives might just fade 
away and that would be throwing away a useful international institution to no 
particular purpose. In that sense I think the Secretariat is essential. 
 
SO: Sir, thank you very, very much indeed.   
 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
 
